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MIRRORED  EXTERNALITIES
Lisa Grow Sun* and Brigham Daniels**
ABSTRACT
A fundamental but underappreciated truth is that positive and negative externalities are
actually mirror reflections of each other.  What we call “mirrored externalities” exist because any
action with externalities associated with it can be described as a choice to do or to refrain from
doing that particular action.  For example, if a person smokes and thereby creates a negative
externality of more secondhand smoke, then her choice not to smoke creates a positive externality
of less secondhand smoke.  Conversely, if a person’s choice to get an immunization confers a
positive externality of reducing vectors for disease transmission, then a choice not to get an immu-
nization necessarily imposes negative externalities on third parties in the form of more vectors for
disease.  In each set, the negative externalities are the inverse—the mirror image—of the positive
externalities.  Thus, we have two possible characterizations or framings of any decision, one of
which focuses on negative externalities and the other of which focuses on positive externalities.
Which framing tends to predominate may be influenced by a number of factors, including soci-
ety’s baseline sense of the actor’s legal or moral entitlement to engage in (or refrain from engaging
in) particular behavior, the availability of a villain to whom to ascribe negative externalities,
and the relative invisibility of certain externalities until disaster strikes, when the negative fram-
ing becomes the face of the crisis.
Ultimately, the framing of externalities has profound effects on both the way we think about
and process externalities and on our politics and policy development.  We see profound potential
impacts of framing on human perception of risk and opportunities, particularly due to the impli-
cations of the Nobel Prize-winning work of behavioral economists Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman.  Their work on human perception suggests that due to loss aversion, the availability
heuristic, and our bimodal response to catastrophic risk, we will give much greater weight and
attention to negative externalities and consistently undervalue positive externalities.  While posi-
tive externality frames are more effective in inspiring voluntary action, negative frames have
serious implications for policy decision-making.  The choice to emphasize either the positive or
negative externality in the mirrored set shapes the array of policy prescriptions we are likely to
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consider.  The same choice may affect whether we think there is a real problem to be solved in the
first instance.  We find loss aversion at work in policymaking as well:  negative externalities, we
suggest, are often viewed as a call to action, while positive externalities are viewed merely as an
occasion for celebration.  Lastly, the negative-externality “call to action” is often a concerted
campaign to redefine the legal and social meaning of particular activities.
Given the critical role externalities play in justifying both development of property rights and
intervention in markets and individual liberties, understanding mirrored externalities and the
consequences of our framing of them is vital.
INTRODUCTION
Externalities are ubiquitous.1  Moreover, the existence of externalities is
one of the most commonly proffered, and most widely accepted, arguments
for government intervention in markets and individual liberty.2  Externalities
likewise feature prominently in accounts of the development of property
rights.3  And, despite their importance, our understanding of externalities is
often quite incomplete.
1 See, e.g., ANNE STEINEMANN, MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 191 (2d ed.
2011) (“Because of the proximity of everyday activities, some type of externality arises from
virtually every action, public or private.”).  Externalities play a central role in many activi-
ties and policy areas. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 446
(2002) (concentration of adult bookstores); Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission v.
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (gambling); United States v. Miles,
228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d, 130 F. App’x 108 (9th Cir. 2005) (law
enforcement); MARK BLAUG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 108
(1970) (education); Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 44 (2006) (taxes); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Gov-
ernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 752, 781–82 (1995) (federalism); Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The
Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 104 (2006) (politics of disaster
management); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
258 (2007) (intellectual property); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 802 (2001) (internet); Leslie Meltzer Henry &
Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1156
(2012) (civil rights); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing
the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 981 (2010) (charitable giving); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegel-
man, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214 (2012) (prop-
erty); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1212 (1992)
(pollution); George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of State-Sanctioned Medical Mari-
juana: Gonzales v. Raich, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (drug enforcement);
Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the Regulatory
Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1073, 1096–98 (2000) (technological
advancements).
2 See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 29–30 (4th ed. 1932); R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
3 See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 12 (1989) (“Primary
motivations for contracting for property rights are common pool losses.  Capturing a share
of the expected gains from mitigating common pool conditions encourages individuals to
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Externalities seem simple, at least at first glance.  We can easily define
negative externalities as costs an actor imposes on third parties.  We might
further note that because an actor imposes these costs on others, the actor is
unlikely to take them into account adequately in his decision-making.  In
contrast, we could describe positive externalities as benefits that an actor’s
decisions confer on third parties—benefits that, again, the actor is unlikely to
account for in his decision-making, as he does not capture those benefits for
himself.  On closer examination, however, this simple explanation of exter-
nalities belies considerable complexity.
Consider the memorable example that Coase introduced more than fifty
years ago of the rocky relationship between two neighbors—a rancher and a
farmer.4  The main point of friction between the two was that the rancher’s
cows wanted to eat the farmer’s crops.  Coase explained that we might think
about the externalities imposed on the farmer, which took the form of crops
destroyed by the straying cattle.  Yet, everything was not peaches and cream
for the rancher either.  He likewise could complain of externalities from the
farmer’s actions: the farmer’s crops attracted the rancher’s cows, which made
it much more difficult for the rancher to corral and care for the wander-
prone cattle.
Given that the farmer’s and rancher’s benefits and costs were just the
converse of each other, how should we consider the externality?  Coase’s
question spurred a sea change in economic and legal scholarship.  Among
other things, scholars have attempted to help us think through factors we
ought to consider when unpacking the question of who to hold responsible
for externalities.5  We have also learned that in allocating liability for exter-
nalities, societal norms and perceptions tend to trump law, politics, and
economics.6
While Coase’s insights into reciprocal bilateral externalities—where one
neighbor’s cost is the other neighbor’s gain—are well established, this Article
attempts to tease out another wrinkle of externalities and posits an additional
mirrored dimension of externalities.  The mirror’s inflection point is
between negative externalities (costs imposed on third parties) and positive
externalities (benefits conferred on third parties).
Using Coase’s example, regardless of which party we focus upon as the
source of the externality, we could deem that party’s potential decision as
establish or to modify property rights to limit access and to control resource use.”); Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350–53 (1967)
(“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization
become larger than the cost of internalization.”).
4 See generally Coase, supra note 2, at 2–5.
5 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972) (proposing an inte-
grated approach to “entitlements which are protected by property, liability, or
inalienability rules” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 731 (1973) (explaining the importance of societal
norms—“notion[s] of normalcy”—in the characterization of externalities).
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creating either negative externalities or positive externalities.  Focusing on
the rancher, for example, we could characterize a rancher who chooses to
allow his cattle to roam as imposing a negative externality on the farmer in
the form of destroyed crops.  Alternatively, we could discuss a rancher who
stops his cattle from roaming as conferring on the farmer the positive exter-
nality of preserved crops.  The same logic would hold if we characterized the
farmer as the source of the externality.
Unlike the mirrored relationship focused on by Coase, which has
spawned a rich body of scholarship, the notion that positive and negative
externalities are actually mirror reflections of each other is a fundamental
but underappreciated truth.  Indeed, this basic insight, a concept we call
“mirrored externalities,” has been almost entirely neglected in the literature.
These “mirrored externalities” exist because any action with externalities
associated with it can be described as a choice to do or to refrain from doing
that particular action.  That is, if an act results in a negative externality,
refraining from that act necessarily creates a positive externality, and vice
versa.  As a result, any potential decision that implicates externalities can be
described, alternatively, as acting or failing to act and thus can be framed as
creating either negative or positive externalities.
Since this mirrored property of positive and negative externalities sits at
the heart of this Article, it is worth considering a few more examples for the
sake of clarity.  A textbook example of an action conferring positive externali-
ties on society is an individual’s decision to be vaccinated.  The positive exter-
nality will come as no surprise: the vaccinated individual’s resulting immunity
contributes to “herd immunity” that confers protection on the community at
large and on unvaccinated individuals, in particular.
However, this classic example of a positive externality could easily, if per-
haps somewhat less naturally, be recharacterized as a negative externality.
We could construe the decision to remain unvaccinated as creating a nega-
tive externality: the unvaccinated individual is a potential disease vector and
may transmit infectious diseases to others.
We find the same mirrored property when it comes to quintessential
negative externalities.  Consider a classic example of a negative externality:
the harm associated with pollution arising from industrial processes.  The
pollution may result in higher health costs and increased environmental deg-
radation.  To the extent that this is true, it is equally true that cutting back on
those processes would result in the positive externalities of health savings and
environmental preservation.
In legal scholarship, the few scholars who have noted in specific contexts
that positive and negative externalities can be mirror images of each other7
7 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1086 (2005) (arguing that “[n]egative externalities can be distinguished
from positive externalities only by identifying a baseline, and the choice of a baseline is
generally considered arbitrary as a matter of theory[,]” and “[t]hus, a situation involving
an apparent ‘negative’ externality can always be described with equal accuracy as involving
a ‘positive’ externality if the arbitrary baseline is changed”); Ellickson, supra note 6, at 731
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have done so primarily in passing and have not explored the questions of
framing: what factors influence whether mirrored externalities are framed as
negative or positive and how does framing influence individual and policy
choices?8  And yet, how we frame the externalities associated with a particular
decision or issue can have a profound effect on how individuals process those
externalities and how the legal system responds to them.  This Article
explores these critical, but neglected, questions.
Part I of this Article provides a foundational backdrop for our considera-
tion of mirrored externalities.  It introduces our conception of mirrored
externalities and provides a brief sketch of the framing issues involved.  This
Part then explores ten examples of mirrored externalities and their framing.
The first five are drawn from archetypal narratives of externalities in the liter-
ature.  The following five demonstrate the diverse array of policy contexts in
(noting that “[t]he distinction in economic theory between harmful and beneficial spil-
lovers reflects an underlying notion of normalcy” and that “[m]odern scholars may be
surprised that Pigou thought the proper way to handle air pollution was to give bounties to
factories that cleaned up emissions, rather than to tax polluters” but that “[i]n an era when
it was normal to pollute with coal-burning fireplaces, Pigou was probably right in recogniz-
ing that rewards were the most efficient internalization system and in perceiving the rare
nonpolluter as a producer of beneficial externalities”); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1719 (2011) (noting that “[i]f ‘harm-imposing’ and ‘benefit-
withholding’ actions are indistinguishable, strategic negative spillovers—opportunistically
imposing harms on others—and strategic positive spillovers—opportunistically withhold-
ing benefits from others—may be functionally equivalent”); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance
Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 758 (2008) (noting that wetland owners may view
wetland preservation as producing “positive externalities”—ecosystem services to others—
whereas adjacent landowners will view the loss of those services as a “significant economic
injury”); cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 618 (2001)
(recognizing that “[g]ivings and takings are mirror images of one another” and that both
may involve externalities).  In the social sciences literature, Annette Steinacker explains
the mirrored nature of externalities, but she does not explore the possibilities of external-
ity framing effects, which are at the heart of our Article. See Annette Steinacker, Externali-
ties, Prospect Theory, and Social Construction: When Will Government Act, What Will Government
Do?, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 459, 459 (2006).  She argues that initial “[a]ssignment of property
rights establishes a baseline” that then dictates whether changes from those baselines are
positive or negative externalities. Id.  She concludes that “current users” are “most likely to
be assigned the initial property rights to continue producing the externality,” id. at 475,
and that the level of externalities is therefore unlikely to reach the socially optimal level, as
“[l]oss aversion” and the “endowment effect” mean that initial rights holders will value
those rights too highly, which will prevent optimal Coasian bargaining even in the absence
of transaction costs. Id. at 473–74.  Interestingly, while we judge her article of great worth,
it has never been explored or even cited in the law review literature.
8 While a fair amount has been said about the framing of Coasian bilateral externali-
ties, which revolves around the choice of which party to whom to attribute an externality
(usually a negatively framed externality), very little has been said about the implications of
framing mirrored externalities.  This discussion does not attempt to allocate externalities
between two conflicting sides, but rather involves labeling an actor’s choice to engage in a
particular activity or refrain from that activity as generating positive or negative
externalities.
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which questions of externalities play a central role.  Part I concludes with a
brief overview of broad trends in the framing of externalities.
Part II of this Article unpacks some of the factors that affect whether we
tend to gravitate to a positive or negative framing of the externalities attrib-
uted to a particular decision or issue.  We suggest that these framing choices
may be influenced by a number of factors, including society’s baseline sense
of the actor’s legal or moral entitlement to engage in (or refrain from engag-
ing in) particular behavior, the availability of a villain to whom to ascribe
negative externalities, and the relative invisibility of certain externalities until
disaster strikes—when the negative framing becomes the face of the crisis.
The influence of these factors suggests that the framing decision is somewhat
constrained, rather than infinitely malleable.  Nonetheless, for many actions
or decisions, our baseline intuitions may be sufficiently vague, unsettled, or
contested that either a positive or negative framing is plausible or even
credible.
Part III considers why these questions of framing matter so much.  The
choice of frame can have important, and as yet largely unexamined, conse-
quences for both scholarly and political discourse about externalities.  We
examine two sets of such consequences here.  First, in Section III.A, we con-
sider the effect framing has on individual cognition—the way we think about
and process externalities.  Prospect theory, developed by Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman, suggests that we will give much greater weight and atten-
tion to negative externalities and consistently undervalue positive externali-
ties due to loss aversion, the availability heuristic, and our bimodal response
to catastrophic risk.
Then, in Section III.B, we explore four primary effects that the framing
of mirrored externalities has on our politics and policy development.  First,
the standard array of policy prescriptions proposed for remedying negative
externalities (taxes, fines, and prohibitions) differs substantially from the
standard remedies proposed for positive externalities (subsidies, education,
and government provision of goods).  The framing choice thus shapes, even
if it does not dictate, the terms of the debate over appropriate solutions.  Sec-
ond, the choice of frame may affect whether we think there is a real problem
to be solved in the first instance.  Negative externalities, we suggest, are often
viewed as a call to action, while positive externalities are viewed merely as an
occasion for celebration.  Moreover, both loss aversion and the possibility of
“availability cascades”—which are usually triggered by negative, rather than
positive, stories and can generate public demand for political response9—
suggest that we are more likely to be motivated to address negative externali-
ties than positive ones.  Third, the negative externality “call to action” is often
a concerted campaign to redefine the legal and social meaning of particular
activities.  Thus, the framing of externalities is not only influenced by soci-
9 Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 687 (1999) (describing “availability entrepreneurs” who seek to “advance their
own agendas . . . by fixing people’s attention on specific problems” (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
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ety’s sense of underlying entitlements but also influences our sense of those
very entitlements.  And, finally, we consider how positive framing creates the
possibility for hero narratives and perhaps even true heroes, as positive fram-
ing may make calls to sacrifice voluntarily for the common good more
convincing.
I. MIRRORED EXTERNALITIES AND FRAMING
A. Defining Mirrored Externalities
Mirrored externalities exist because any given decision can be described
as a choice to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing.  If the actor’s
choice to do that thing (smoking) imposes negative externalities on a third
party (more secondhand smoke), then her choice not to do that same thing
necessarily confers positive externalities on that third party (less secondhand
smoke).  Conversely, if the actor’s choice to do a particular thing (beekeep-
ing) confers positive externalities on a third party (increased pollination of
plants), then a choice not to do that same thing necessarily imposes negative
externalities on that third party (reduced pollination of plants).10  In each
set, the negative externalities are the inverse—the mirror image—of the posi-
tive externalities.  Thus, we have two possible characterizations or framings of
any decision, one of which focuses on negative externalities and the other of
which focuses on positive externalities.
It is equally important to understand what we do not mean when we
speak of mirrored externalities.  By mirrored externalities, we do not mean
that the same external effect might be viewed as positive by some third par-
ties and negative by others (for example, that one neighbor might enjoy the
green paint color the other chose for her house, while other neighbors might
hate it).11  Nor do we mean that externalities are reciprocal in the sense that
10 See Steinacker, supra note 7, at 459 (“Every externality problem can be conceived in
two ways: if an action creates one type of externality, failing to act creates the opposite
type.”).
11 Or, on a more controversial note, that the climate changes triggered by greenhouse
gas emissions might make some colder climates more tolerable and some warmer climates
less tolerable. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 206, 221–22 (2012) (“[W]arming in [cold] regions could produce benefits such as
longer growing seasons for agriculture, reduced strain on transportation infrastructure
from freezing, longer outdoor recreation and tourism seasons, reduced health hazards of
severe cold, fewer work stoppages due to cold weather conditions, lower winter heating
bills, and better ocean transportation and resource extraction options in previously frozen
regions.” (footnotes omitted)).  Similarly, some things that many people view as harmful—
such as pesticides, noise from barking dogs, and pornography—are affirmatively valued by
others. See John Copeland Nagle, Good Pollution, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 31, 32
(2013) (arguing that “[w]hat some regard as a harmful pollutant is valued by others as
providing a valuable benefit”).
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they are the bilateral sort that Coase identified12—that we can, for example,
view a company’s pollution as imposing costs on its neighbors or view its
neighbors’ demand for clean air as imposing costs on the company.13  That
externalities are inherently bilateral is so central to Coase’s work that these
bilateral externalities are often referred to as “Coasian” externalities.14
B. Framing Mirrored Externalities
The framing of a Coasian bilateral externality is typically a choice about
to which side to attribute a (usually negatively framed) externality.  The fram-
ing of a mirrored externality is somewhat different.  Rather than allocating
externalities between two conflicting sides, we are choosing whether to attri-
bute positive or negative externalities to one actor’s decision by focusing
either on the externalities that flow from his choice to engage in a particular
activity or from his choice to refrain from that activity.  Because activity and
inactivity are mirror images, their externalities will be mirror images as well.
Thus, the framing question for mirrored externalities is which half of the
mirrored pair (negative or positive) we emphasize for any particular issue or
decision.
As we explore more carefully in Part II, there is some overlap between
the factors that influence the framing of bilateral externalities and those that
influence the framing of mirrored externalities, but not a perfect correlation.
And as Part III makes clear, understanding the framing of mirrored external-
ities is as important as unpacking the framing of bilateral externalities.
C. Examples of Mirrored Externality Framing
In this subpart we introduce ten examples of mirrored externality
frames.  The first five of these are from classic examples of externalities in the
literature, restated through the lens of mirrored externalities.  The last five
illustrate the diversity of policy areas in which we can find externality
framing.
1. Pigou’s Locomotive Sparks
Many trace the concept of externalities to the economist Arthur Pigou.
In laying out an argument that has grown into today’s notion of externalities,
he provides the following example: “costs are thrown upon people not
directly concerned, through, say, uncompensated damage done to surround-
12 See Coase, supra note 2, at 2 (“We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.
To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.  The real question that has to be decided
is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?”).
13 HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (2d ed. 2011).
14 See, e.g., RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBER-
TARIAN PATERNALISM 111 n.44 (2012) (providing an example of a “Coasian externality”);
Alan Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 36–46
(1974) (describing the development of Coasian externality theory).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-DEC-14 14:39
2014] mirrored  externalities 143
ing woods by sparks from railway engines.”15  Probably because of Pigou, a
sparking train causing forest fires serves as a classic negative externality.
However, as advertising campaigns from the Forest Service constantly remind
us, forest fires are not only started, but they are also prevented.  Sparks that
fly and burn down forests are the negative externality framing; sparks that are
dowsed, saving forests, represent a positive externality.
2. Coase’s Mismatched Neighbors
In his classic article, The Problem of Social Cost, Coase suggests that exter-
nalities are inherently bilateral.16  He illustrates his point with an example of
two neighbors, a rancher and a farmer, and the challenges related to the
“problem . . . of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring
land.”17  In probably the most well-known example of a bilateral externality,
Coase argued that we can think of the rancher imposing an externality upon
the farmer—the cows destroy the farmer’s crops—or the farmer imposing an
externality on the rancher—the crops attract the cows and make the cows
more difficult to contain.18  Of course, Coase focuses on negative externali-
ties in discussing social costs.  If Coase had been thinking of a different pro-
ject, perhaps titled “The Virtue of Social Benefits,” each of these examples could
alternatively have been captured with a positive frame.  For example, the
fence that Coase hypothesizes, which would effectively eliminate Coase’s
bilateral externality, would have created positive externalities, protecting the
farmer’s crops and keeping the rancher’s cows corralled.19
3. Demsetz’s Fur Pelts
In Toward a Theory of Property Rights,20 Demsetz presents a forceful argu-
ment that “property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains
of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”21  To illus-
trate his argument, Demsetz provides a historical example of the U.S. fur
trade.  He argued that a negative externality of hunting—fewer animals for
others to hunt—caused a change in rights to real property in the nineteenth
century, converting parts of the frontier from an unmanaged commons into
large, privately owned tracts.22  This is once again a question of framing.
One could reverse this negative framing and focus instead on how reducing
hunting could result in more animals for others.
15 PIGOU, supra note 2, at 134.
16 Coase, supra note 2, at 2.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 2–3.
19 Id. at 3.
20 Demsetz, supra note 3.
21 Id. at 350.
22 Id. at 352.
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4. Hardin’s Pasture
In the late 1960s, Garrett Hardin introduced a story of herders that
resulted in a special kind of externality he dubbed “the tragedy of the com-
mons.”23  While each herder who added a cow to the commons took the cow
home for the slaughter (internalizing all the benefits of adding a cow), the
costs of the cows were hoisted on all other herders on the pasture (externaliz-
ing virtually all the costs of adding a cow).  These costs, themselves negative
externalities, came in the form of an increasingly over-grazed pasture.24
Many have criticized Hardin and argued that overgrazing was far from inevi-
table and that cooperation in such a context often occurs.25  Had the herders
come to an agreement to cut back grazing on the commons, they would have
found that subtracting cows results in the positive externality of increased
forage.26
5. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company27
This classic nuisance case arose when landowners adjacent to a cement
plant complained that “dirt, smoke and vibration”28 from the plant’s opera-
tions were injuring their land.  Nuisance cases, of course, always emphasize
the negative side of the mirrored externality set, as the plaintiffs are currently
bearing those costs, and those costs justify the requested relief.  Enjoining the
nuisance, however, would allow plaintiffs the benefit of the “peaceful, quiet,
and undisturbed use and enjoyment” of their land.29
6. Wetlands
Wetlands provide a wide variety of ecosystem services to surrounding
property and the community at large, including flooding and storm surge
protection, erosion prevention, water filtration, fish and wildlife habitat, and
recreational opportunities.30  If a landowner preserves the wetlands on her
property, she thus confers these positive externalities on adjacent landowners
and community members.  Conversely, if she instead destroys the wetlands
23 See Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1–28 (1990); CAROL M. ROSE,
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 37 (1994).
26 Not surprisingly, the typical description of the tragedy of the commons employs the
negative framing of the externality. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOM-
ICS 225 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining that the herders in the tragedy of the commons “neglect
th[e] negative externality” of degrading the common lands for other herders and sug-
gesting that the town could remedy this problem by creating private property rights, regu-
lating the number of animals, taxing animals, or “auction[ing] off a limited number of . . .
grazing permits”).
27 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
28 Id. at 871.
29 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (2014).
30 KIM D. CONNOLLY ET AL., WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY:  UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404,
at 2 (2005).
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on her property, she eliminates these ecosystem services and thus imposes on
others the costs of increased flooding and erosion and decreased water qual-
ity, habitat, and recreational choices.31
7. Education
Education is perhaps the most cited example of an activity generating
positive externalities.  Commonly identified societal benefits of education
include lower crime rates, decreased welfare dependence, more informed
voters, and a healthier and more productive workforce.32  Assuming those
assertions are true, citizens who choose not to educate themselves or their
children, who drop out of school, or who choose not to pursue higher educa-
tion may impose corresponding costs on society by contributing to higher
crime rates, higher demand for welfare, uninformed voting, and decreased
economic productivity.
8. Carpooling
Carpooling produces a host of positive benefits that cannot be fully cap-
tured by those who choose to carpool: decreased traffic congestion, fossil fuel
consumption, and automobile emissions.33  Of course, the choice to ride sin-
gly rather than carpool imposes mirrored negative externalities on the com-
munity in the form of longer commutes, increased fuel consumption, and
higher levels of mobile-source pollution.34
31 See Ruhl, supra note 7, at 758 (noting that from the perspective of landowners
whose wetlands have “natural capital,” the “ecosystem services” generated by those wet-
lands “often are positive externalities leaking off the parcel,” whereas from the perspective
“of the owners of land where [those] services are enjoyed . . . curtailment of the services
through degradation of the natural capital could pose significant economic injury”); see
also Carey Schmidt, Private Wetlands and Public Values: “Navigable Waters” and the Significant
Nexus Test Under the Clean Water Act, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 116 (2005)
(arguing that developers reap the benefits of filling wetlands while the public has to
“foot[ ] the bill for the lost value of the wetland and pays more to treat water, control
flooding and reclamation, protect endangered species and greenspace, as well as incurring
a myriad of other negative externalities”).
32 See sources cited infra note 84.
33 Cf. KENNETH A. SMALL, URBAN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 151 (1992) (“Carpool-
ing provides flexible service with far less use of highway infrastructure and parking facilities
than solo driver [sic].”); Tirza S. Wahrman, Breaking the Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested
Urban Roadways Under the Clean Air Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled,
8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 181, 195–96 (1998) (“Discouraging the peak usage of automo-
biles on major urban roadways . . . would reduce motor vehicle use at those times of day
when pollution impacts and lost traffic time are most problematic.”).
34 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Com-
modifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1236–37 (2000) (“The prevalence of
[single occupant vehicles] on American roads . . . has contributed significantly to the traf-
fic congestion that plagues many urban neighborhoods. . . . Idling in traffic results in
significant emissions of greenhouse gasses and other forms of pollution.”).
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9. Antibiotic Use
Every time an antibiotic is used, the future effectiveness of the antibiotic
is potentially diminished because bacteria may develop resistance to that
antibiotic.35  The problem of antibiotic resistance is commonly described as
one of negative externalities: antibiotic users (and prescribing doctors) fail to
account for the future costs of diminished antibiotic effectiveness when they
decide whether to use antibiotics to treat a particular malady.36  The mirror
image framing of the problem is less commonly presented but not difficult to
articulate: an individual’s choice not to use antibiotics in a particular course
of treatment confers positive externalities on future antibiotic users that the
current patient cannot capture.
10. Intellectual Property
Individuals who exercise and share their creativity—whether in the form
of technological innovations, poetry, art, or music—generate innumerable
positive externalities.  In the case of inventions, for instance, users may get
far more benefit from a new technology than inventors can capture in the
price they charge (particularly because many uses may be unanticipated),
and other inventors may build on the initial innovation to create new and
different products.37  And, while we rarely think of it this way, inventors who
sit on their inventions rather than patenting and developing them or who
35 See, e.g., Ramanan Laxminarayan & Gardner M. Brown, Economics of Antibiotic Resis-
tance: A Theory of Optimal Use, 42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 183, 183–84 (2001) (“The prob-
lem of resistance represents an externality associated with the use of antibiotics,
antimalarial drugs, or pesticides.  Associated with each beneficial application of these treat-
ments is the increased likelihood that they will be less effective for oneself and for others
when used in the future.”).
36 Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U.
L. REV. 611, 613 (2005) (noting that “antibiotic consumption has a negative external effect
on future consumption” because “there is no way for future potential users to pay present
low-value users to forego consumption”); id. at 626 (“Unless there is some mechanism to
force consumers to bear this cost when they buy antibiotics, they will ignore it and the
populace will overuse antibiotics relative to the socially optimal level.  To put this in stark
terms, cheap and easy access to antibiotics today means that people will use them for very
minor infections, and even for conditions that are likely caused by a virus or other
microbe.  Bacteria will develop resistance, and the drug will then be unavailable to treat
life-threatening and seriously debilitating infections in the (possibly near-term) future.”);
Laxminarayan & Brown, supra note 35, at 184 (“Despite the huge potential consequences
of antibiotic resistance to the treatment and cure of infectious diseases, the costs of resis-
tance are not internalized during the process of antibiotic treatment. . . . The problem,
therefore, arises from the absence of economic incentives for individuals to take into
account the negative impact of their use of antibiotics on social welfare.”).
37 Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097,
1099 (2005) (“There is a growing literature on the importance of technological spillovers
to innovation and long-run productivity growth.”).
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never invent in the first place impose negative externalities on society by
hoarding or squandering their creativity.38
* * *
The preceding examples demonstrate the wide variety of contexts in
which mirrored externalities exist.  There are, of course, many other exam-
ples of mirrored externalities.  We could continue on in this vein, consider-
ing honeybee pollination, bank stability, smoking, obesity, crop diversity and
food security, dam safety, and a whole host of other issues.  That mirrored
externalities arise in such a diversity of contexts suggests the importance of a
careful examination of their contours and framing.
D. Broad Trends in Externality Framing
Given that, as the prior examples illustrate, every decision can be framed
as imposing either positive or negative externalities, we might expect that
both positive externalities and negative externalities would get equal play in
public discourse.  An examination of corpus linguistics data,39 however,
shows quite the opposite.  In fact, we seem to be focusing more and more on
the negative.  The data suggests that there is a decided trend toward speaking
of negative externalities, rather than positive externalities.
One useful tool for demonstrating this divergence is the Google Books
Ngram Viewer.  When we enter words or phrases in the Ngram Viewer, the
viewer generates a graph depicting how those words or phrases—ngrams—
have occurred in a linguistics corpus of over 500 billion words, comprised of
5.2 million books.40  On the x-axis of the viewer is time and on the y-axis is
the percentage the ngram appears out of all other ngrams of its type.  The
Ngram Viewer allows us to see how the frequency of word use has changed
over time and can compare the data for multiple ngrams on one chart.
38 Duffy, supra note 7, at 1088 (noting, for example, that when a professor “chooses
not to write a casebook . . . the cost of the professor’s laziness would be borne entirely by
others, who would not receive the benefits of her writing”).
39 Corpus linguistics is an empirical “linguistic methodology that analyzes language
function and use by means of an electronic database called a corpus.”  Stephen C. Mourit-
sen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain
Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1954.  For a more full explanation of corpus linguistics
and some of its uses in legal analysis, see id.
40 See What Does the Ngram Viewer Do?, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/
ngrams/info (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).  More specifically, the Google Ngram Viewer is a
way to search for terms—or ngrams—within this corpus.  An “ngram” is a sequence of n
terms, which, in this case, are collected from linguistic corpora.  An ngram with only one
term is often referred to as a unigram, two terms is a bigram.  The output of a search is
displayed on a Cartesian plane.  The y-axis shows the ngram’s frequency as a percentage of
total ngrams of that type.  For example, for the unigram “externality” the y-axis would
display “externality” as a percentage of all unigrams, whereas the bigram “negative exter-
nality” is displayed as a percentage of all bigrams.  The x-axis is an interval of time deter-
mined by the user that can vary from the year 1500 through 2008. See id.
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Consider the Google Ngram for the bigrams “negative externality” and
“positive externality”:
between 1960 and from the corpus2008
Graph these comma-separated phrases: negative externality,positive externality case-insensitive












19701960 1965 1985 19901975 1980 20051995 2000
negative externality
positive externality
This ngram demonstrates that, since the use of the terms “positive exter-
nality” and “negative externality” took off in the 1960s, there has been a
decided gap in frequency, with “negative externality” used more often than
“positive externality.”41  That gap has widened since the mid-1990s.
Moreover, the word “externality” itself seems to appear more often in a
negative, rather than a positive, context.  Analysis of the word “externality” in
a smaller, but more sophisticated linguistics corpus, the Corpus of Contem-
porary American English (COCA),42 shows that the number one word associ-
41 The Supreme Court uses the term “externality” in the sense we address in this Arti-
cle only four times, and all four uses employ a negative frame. See Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) (noting that states can legitimately
“insist[ ] that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct”); City of
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 445–46 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (describing the negative externalities of adult businesses); Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 195 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat” imposes “costs” or “externali-
ties” on citizens living outside the affected area (internal quotation marks omitted));
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (disputing majority’s holding that a permanent physical occupation of land
(installation of cables) should be characterized as a per se taking given that much
“[m]odern government regulation exudes intangible ‘externalities’ that may diminish the
value of private property far more than minor physical touchings”).  This is, of course, only
a snapshot of usage with a very small N.
42 See Mark Davies, Introduction, CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG., http://corpus.byu.edu/
coca/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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ated with “externality” is “negative.”  Of the top fifteen collocates43—words
often found in close association with our test word “externality”—four bear a
negative connotation, one is positive, and the others are neutral or ambigu-
ous.44  These results suggest the need to think carefully about the reasons we
frame issues negatively or positively and how that affects the way we process
and respond to those underlying issues.
II. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF FRAME
While every externality can be described as a mirrored pair—one posi-
tive and one negative—some framing choices seem much more natural or
even inevitable.  A number of factors may influence whether, for any particu-
lar issue or decision, the associated externalities are more naturally framed as
positive or negative.
First, our sense of the baseline entitlements to engage in (or refrain
from engaging in) a particular activity often plays an important role in deter-
mining how externalities are characterized.  These intuitions about underly-
ing entitlements are often bound up in the (real or perceived) existing
allocation of relevant rights and the strength of those rights.  “Softer” entitle-
ments like perceived moral entitlements and social norms may likewise influ-
ence framing.  Second, the availability (or absence) of a good villain may
shape how externalities are perceived and presented.  Third, some externali-
ties are largely invisible—or at least underappreciated—until a crisis or disas-
ter exposes them, and when disaster strikes, the negative framing will almost
certainly predominate.  The following sections explore and unpack these fac-
tors that influence whether we will tend to describe a particular issue in the
negative or positive externality frame.
A. Baseline Intuitions: Rights, Entitlements, and Social Norms
Established or perceived baselines can undoubtedly influence whether
the externalities associated with a particular issue are more naturally viewed
as positive or negative.  Indeed, the importance of baseline to determining
43 As Stephen Mouritsen notes: “ ‘Collocation is the tendency of words to be biased in
the way they co-occur,’ that is, the tendency of certain words to be used in the same seman-
tic environment as other words.”  Mouritsen, supra note 39, at 1962 (footnote omitted)
(quoting SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 68 (2002)).  “A collocation
program calculates collocation rates based on a node word.” Id. (emphasis omitted).  Our
node word is “externality.”  Then, “[t]he program proceeds by ‘count[ing] the instances of
all words occurring within a particular span, for example, four words to the left of the node
word and four words to the right.’” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting HUNSTON, supra 69).
44 The second most common collocate is “positive,” however, and the low-N for all
collocates means that we cannot draw particularly firm conclusions.  The complete list of
the top fifteen collocates for “externality” in COCA, with the number of uses is (from most
common to least common):  negative (58), positive (50), environmental (43), such (41),
market (40), economic (35), costs (31), effects (26), public (25), associated (24), pollution
(22), goods (22), cost (21), benefits (19), and example (19).  We counted environmental
as a neutral term, but it is arguably more closely associated with costs than benefits.
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whether an impact is properly characterized as a “cost” or a “benefit” has
been recognized in a variety of disparate contexts, from Takings Clause case
law45 to Establishment Clause jurisprudence.46  These baselines, in turn, are
shaped by our sense of the legal and moral entitlements to engage in particu-
lar activities.47
The impact of our sense of underlying entitlements on externality fram-
ing is perhaps clearest in the context of Coasian bilateral externalities.  When
we are trying to decide whether to attribute an externality to one side or the
other, our sense of who has the strongest entitlement or right to their pre-
ferred state of being is quite likely to drive our assignment of the externality.
For example, if a landowner has an established right under current zoning
laws to build a tall building, we might well view his neighbor’s competing
interest in collecting solar energy as the source of the negative externality in
their conflict, particularly if the neighbor’s asserted interest has no current
legal protection.  Conversely, if the neighbor has an established “solar ease-
ment” to collect solar energy, we might be more inclined to say that the other
landowner’s construction of a tall building will impose negative externalities
on the neighbor.48
45 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–31 (1992) (using com-
mon law nuisance principles as a baseline for determining whether government develop-
ment prohibitions “take” anything from the landowner); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note
7, at 612–14 (discussing the appropriate baseline “from which givings and takings should
be measured”).
46 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues
of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (arguing in the Establishment Clause
context that “[t]o determine whether religion has been ‘aided’ or ‘penalized’ (terms the
Court has used synonymously with ‘advanced’ and ‘inhibited’) one needs a baseline: ‘aid’
or ‘penalty’ as compared to what?”); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (2004) (“Whether we tend to call an externality harmful or beneficial
depends on what we are likely to assume, if only implicitly, about the standard of refer-
ence.”); Steinacker, supra note 7, at 459 (arguing that the “[a]ssignment of property rights
establishes a baseline” that then dictates whether an externality “is defined as a negative or
positive externality”).  In contrast to our arguments, Steinacker apparently believes that
existing rights assignments are the only factor influencing whether an externality is viewed
as positive or negative. See id.; see also id. at 462 (whether an externality is positive or
negative “is determined by the assignment of the right to take action”).
47 Cf. Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 1, 41 (2004) (arguing that “[w]hen clean air, clean water, and freedom from poi-
sons are seen as [individual] rights, their protection from ‘taking’ as a right becomes
clearer, and the necessary mechanisms for protection also become clearer”).
48 The Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted this issue in Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d
182, 189 (Wis. 1982) (holding that unreasonable interference with access to sunlight is an
actionable private nuisance).  Nuisance law is often described as an irreconcilable morass.
Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1224 (1986) (“Nineteenth century nuisance models based on natu-
ral property rights spawned a morass of doctrine incapable of rationalization within a sin-
gle internally consistent normative theory.”).  In our view, this apparent confusion and
seeming inconsistency may largely be explained by the fact that the court must decide,
implicitly at least, as a threshold matter how to frame the bilateral externality.  In some
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In the case of mirrored externalities, our sense of underlying legal rights
may have a more nuanced but still important effect on externality framing.
When the negative externalities flow from what we view as an affirmative act,
we may focus on those externalities even if we believe that the actor has a
legal or moral entitlement to create them.  For example, even if we think that
an actor has a right to emit certain effluents, the resulting effects on neigh-
bors may still be framed as negative externalities, rather than framed in terms
of the positive externalities that eliminating the emissions might produce.
The tendency to focus on the negative framing is, however, likely to be even
more pronounced if we question or affirmatively reject the actor’s right to
engage in that activity.  Thus, for example, negative externalities generally
dominate policy discussions of drunk driving.49
In contrast, when the negative externalities flow instead from a decision
not to act (not to vaccinate, not to seek education, not to keep honeybees)
we may be more likely to instead frame the situation by emphasizing the
mirrored positive externalities.  This dichotomy—between the way we treat
situations where the negative externalities flow from action and those where
the negative externalities flow from perceived inaction—seems bound up in
underlying assumptions about the limits of government power to force us to
act and a corresponding “right” to be free of government compulsion to act.
Recall, for instance, the infamous “broccoli horrible”50 that featured so
prominently in the debates over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA).  Opponents of the act posited a slippery slope of regulation that
would ultimately justify the federal government mandating that individuals
purchase (and maybe even consume!) broccoli.51  While there is undoubt-
edly slipperiness in the activity/inactivity distinction, it resonated strongly
important sense, then, the question confronting the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
whether the developer’s building of the tall building should be viewed as imposing costs on
the neighbor, or the neighbor’s demand for unobstructed solar access should be viewed as
imposing costs on the developer.  Courts can look to a number of factors to aid this fram-
ing decision, such as the character of the neighborhood, the predominant uses of sur-
rounding property, the value of the competing uses, and which use was earlier in time, but
ultimately the court must settle on one of these conflicting frames.
49 The same does not seem to be true of the various “take the keys” campaigns.  This
may not be altogether surprising because often times manufacturers of alcohol fund and
even engage in these campaigns.  Beyond this, as we discuss below, when attempting to
convince people to take voluntary actions, a positive framing may often be more effective.
See infra subsection III.B.4.
50 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg described this argument in her dissent, noting that Chief
Justice Roberts (for the majority) “posits” that Congress “might adopt [a mandate that
citizens purchase broccoli], reasoning that an individual’s failure to eat a healthy diet, like
the failure to purchase health insurance, imposes costs on others.” Id. at 2624.  This
description suggests that some part of what rankled Chief Justice Roberts and the other
members of the majority was the implication that an individual’s decision not to eat a
healthy diet could properly be framed as inflicting negative externalities (“imposing costs”)
on others.
51 See id. at 2591 (majority opinion).
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enough with five Supreme Court Justices to form the basis of the majority’s
conclusion that Congress lacked the Commerce Clause authority to enact the
ACA.52
The role of these real or perceived entitlements in externality framing is
also evident in the framing of patent externalities.  Patent scholars generally
emphasize the positive externalities generated by inventors and their inven-
tions, rather than the negative externalities that failure to invent would
impose on society.  Indeed, many patent scholars have observed that the
notion of “positive externalities” has dominated the discourse about intellec-
tual property rights,53 and it certainly seems most natural to talk about the
inventor’s right to the fruits of his creativity (and thus the positive externali-
ties that his sharing of those fruits creates), rather than the public’s right to
enjoy the benefits of that creativity (and the negative externalities that arise
when an inventor withholds his invention from the public).  This characteri-
zation seems driven by underlying notions of property and autonomy—the
Lockean notion that a person owns himself and thus the fruit of his labor54
(a notion that is the fundamental building block of the labor theory of prop-
erty)55 and the sense that a person has an important autonomy interest in
making his own choices about whether to apply his intellect, creativity, and
energy to a particular problem (or at all).56
An exchange between two prominent patent scholars, John Duffy and
Mark Lemley, highlights the difficulties in recharacterizing patent externali-
ties from a positive to a negative frame.  When Duffy critiqued one of Lem-
ley’s theories about how expansive intellectual property rights should be57 as
52 See id. at 2589 (“To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity
and inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on commerce.  But the distinction
between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers,
who were ‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.”).  Apparently, positing
that Congress has the power to force people to buy and eat broccoli risks a slippery slope
toward tyranny in which kale-based smoothies replace ice cream and in which the govern-
ment sentences people to fat camps and forces them to do Pilates.
53 Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES
617, 622 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (“[M]ost of IP law is concerned with
internalizing positive externalities.”); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual
Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 801, 801 n.1 (2009) (arguing that it would “be better to
modify [Gordon’s] observation by dropping the word ‘internalizing’—that is, to say that
most of IP law is concerned with positive externalities because of the nature of the intellec-
tual activities and resources being subject to legal regulation”).
54 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books
1986) (1690) (“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person.  This nobody has any right to but himself.  The
labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55 Id. (describing how a person takes ownership over something by mingling it with his
labor).
56 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 998 (1982).
57 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1050 (2005) (arguing that “[i]nternalization of positive externalities is not necessary
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drawing “an untenable distinction between positive and negative externali-
ties,”58 Lemley felt free to respond merely that, while Duffy’s basic point was
“true enough,” Duffy’s attempt to recharacterize the positive externalities of
intellectual property as negative externalities felt “forced.”59  He explained:
“We could, I suppose, talk about vesting property rights collectively in the
public in ideas that haven’t yet been invented, so that a failure to invent
imposes negative externalities on those collective property owners.  But no
one does so.”60
The characterization of childhood vaccination externalities provides
another interesting example of the role of (assumed or established) underly-
ing entitlements.  Like patent externalities, vaccination externalities are most
often described in the literature as positive externalities.61  This positive
framing of the societal benefits that flow from the choice to vaccinate one’s
children (rather than the societal costs that flow from choosing not to vacci-
nate) is likely informed by the sense that individuals have an underlying
autonomy interest—and perhaps even a constitutional right—to make that
decision without undue government interference.  While the Supreme Court
upheld compulsory smallpox vaccination enforced by a five dollar fine in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,62 the 1905 holding is arguably inconsistent with
more recent precedent recognizing the right to privacy and bodily integrity
and suggesting that the right to refuse medical treatment may be entitled to
heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.63
at all unless efficient use of the property requires a significant investment that cannot be
recouped another way” and “even then, economic theory properly requires not the com-
plete internalization of positive externalities but only the capture of returns sufficient to
recoup the investment”).
58 Duffy, supra note 7, at 1081.  Duffy argues that:
Negative externalities can be distinguished from positive externalities only by
identifying a baseline, and the choice of a baseline is generally considered arbi-
trary as a matter of theory.  Thus, a situation involving an apparent “negative”
externality can always be described with equal accuracy as involving a “positive”
externality if the arbitrary baseline is changed.
Id. at 1086.
59 Lemley, supra note 37, at 1098 n.4.
60 Id.
61 TIM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST 108 (rev. ed. 2012) (describing child-
hood vaccination in a positive externality frame); Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 55 (2004) (“An example
of a positive externality is vaccination, which benefits not only the patient but also third
parties.”).
62 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
63 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 728 (1997) (assuming, with-
out deciding, that individuals have a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treat-
ment and distinguishing that assumed right from the claimed right to assisted suicide);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (observing in dicta that
“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions,” including
Jacobson itself); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221, 223 (1990) (recognizing that a
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Of course, the status of any constitutional right to refuse vaccination
remains unsettled, and many states have enacted compulsory childhood vac-
cination laws.  However, the fact that most state laws provide religious or phil-
osophical exemptions to these requirements suggests that many citizens feel
that individuals should be able to make that choice for themselves and their
children.64  In the case of vaccination, then, we might be more comfortable
describing the decision to vaccinate as creating positive externalities than
describing failure to vaccinate as creating negative externalities because of an
underlying sense that an individual is, as a constitutional and moral matter,
generally entitled to make his own medical decisions about his body.  These
existing entitlements, however, may not be sufficiently strong to preclude the
negative framing of the externalities.  And, in fact, if most of the public came
to hold the view that people are morally obligated to vaccinate themselves and
their children for the benefit of others, that view might be somewhat incon-
sistent with the positive framing of vaccination externalities, which would
then push toward a more negative framing.65
As this last possibility suggests, in addition to underlying rights, in some
contexts softer entitlements, as well as social obligations, norms, and niceties,
may also influence our baseline intuitions about how a particular externality
should be framed.  Robert Ellickson has established that, in the context of
Coasian externalities, people allow norms to dictate the behavior of neigh-
bors, even when legal rights might point in another direction.66  There
seems little reason to doubt Ellickson’s insights would have significant hold
in the context of mirrored externalities as well.  Expected behavior would
seemingly drive much of whether people frame externalities as positive or
negative.  In the most extreme cases, these norms may mean that only one
characterization of an externality is socially acceptable.  Take, for example,
the effect that motorcycle helmet laws have on the supply of healthy organs
available for donation.  Motorcycles have often been characterized as
“donorcycles,” because the high rate of fatal motorcycle accidents among
otherwise healthy young people creates a supply of healthy organs available
prisoner “possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs” but refusing to grant that interest heightened scrutiny in the prison
context given “the State’s interests in prison safety and security”).
64 See JARED P. COLE & KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21414,
MANDATORY VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT AND CURRENT LAWS 3 (2014) (noting that “[d]espite
the wide-spread imposition of school vaccination requirements, many states provide
exemptions for medical, religious, or philosophical reasons”).
65 Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541, 548 (2003) (“Some philosophers have suggested that one
should not be entitled to claim a right of payment for doing those things that one is mor-
ally obligated to do.” (emphasis omitted)).
66 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 673 (1986); see also Ellickson, supra note 6, at 686 n.17
(describing how the decorative design choices by owners of houses and barns in small
towns throughout Vermont are promoted through aesthetic community norms rather than
land use laws).
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for donation.  Thus, if motorcycle helmet laws prevent deaths of young rid-
ers, it is theoretically possible to describe those laws as creating negative
externalities for those individuals awaiting transplants.
It is, however, hard to imagine anyone describing efforts to reduce acci-
dental deaths of young people as imposing negative externalities on those in
need of organ transplants.  Indeed, a recent study examining the effect of
motorcycle helmet laws on the availability of organs for transplantation
couched its inquiry as whether helmet laws “reduce a beneficial externality
[of rider death] by decreasing the supply of viable organ donors.”67  (They
do.)68  The awkward framing (reducing a positive externality) is almost cer-
tainly an attempt to avoid the even more awkward framing of life-saving as
inflicting negative externalities.69  Put more starkly, while it may be tricky to
speak of the positive externalities of young people dying, it seems all but
inconceivable to speak of the negative externalities of young people living.
Additionally, this example suggests that identifying positive externalities
of particularly undesirable events may also be unpalatable.  In the motorcycle
example, ascribing to motorcycle deaths the silver-lining “positive external-
ity” of organ donation seems natural only in comparison to describing saving
those lives as imposing negative externalities.  The attempt to assign positive
externalities to something as undesirable as untimely death is itself a risky
endeavor.  Recall, for instance, that Philip Morris was roundly condemned
for commissioning a report that argued that smoking saved the Czech Repub-
lic money because smokers died earlier.70  It is hardly surprising that high-
67 Stacy Dickert-Conlin et al., Donorcycles: Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the Supply of Organ
Donors, 54 J.L. & ECON. 907, 907 (2011); see also id. at 929 (concluding that “helmet laws . . .
decrease the positive externalities of helmetless riding by reducing the supply of organ
donors”).
68 Id. at 929.
69 Scholars have identified other, less extreme contexts in which it seems more natu-
ral, given underlying norms and entitlements, to speak of reducing a positive externality
rather than creating a negative externality. See, e.g., James Salzman, Creating Markets for
Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 954 (2005) (noting, in the
context of valuing ecosystems, that “[a]lthough one can imagine settings where degrading
critical habitat can create obvious negative externalities, such as erosion, making habitat
less attractive to species seems closer to eliminating positive externalities, such as providing
nesting and foraging grounds and water retention” and that “[i]n this setting, it does seem
harder to argue that society should demand generation of positive externalities without
payment”).
70 See Lee Dembert, Tobacco Giant’s Analysis Says Premature Deaths Cut Costs in Pensions
and Health Care: Critics Assail Philip Morris Report on Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2001, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2001/07/18/news/18iht-smoking_ed3_.html.  In discussing the
immorality of framing premature smoking-caused deaths as creating positive externalities,
Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue explain that policymakers do not consider this argu-
ment in similar contexts:
[I]n debates over the appropriate response to environmental hazards, we do not
hear polluters urging policymakers to take into account the many pension-saving
deaths that would result if Congress would only leave polluters unregulated.  Like-
wise, opponents of gun control are not heard to tout the enormous financial
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lighting the positive externalities of early death (especially deaths the
company itself hastened) provoked public outrage.
One might argue, more generally, that another factor that influences
externality framing is how much we like or value the activity in question.
Certainly, in the case of Coasian bilateral externalities, an assessment of the
importance and desirability of each competing activity may well influence
which actor is assigned the externality.  For example, if we think solar energy
collection is important and desirable, we may be more likely to attribute the
negative externality to construction of the tall building next door that blocks
the sunlight.71
In a somewhat analogous context, the Supreme Court has noted that
whether we characterize a regulation as “harm-preventing” or “benefit-con-
ferring” depends on just such an assessment.  In the takings case of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,72 Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the
Supreme Court, rejected the State’s argument that a regulation adopted to
prevent serious harm (prevent a “noxious use”) should not trigger the Con-
stitution’s compensation requirement, even if the regulation deprives the
owner of all economically viable use of his land.73
In rejecting this proposed dividing line between compensable and non-
compensable state intrusions on property rights, Justice Scalia argued that
“the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regula-
tion is often in the eye of the beholder.”74  Justice Scalia noted that, in the
Lucas case itself, one could describe the legislature’s prohibition on Lucas
building on his coastal property as “necessary” either “in order to prevent his
use of it from ‘harming’ South Carolina’s ecological resources; or, instead, in
order to achieve the ‘benefits’ of an ecological preserve.”75
Justice Scalia argued that there was no “objective, value-free basis”76 for
choosing between these two characterizations.  Instead, he suggested:
Whether one or the other of the competing characterizations will come to
one’s lips in a particular case depends primarily upon one’s evaluation of
the worth of competing uses of real estate.  A given restraint will be seen as
mitigating “harm” to the adjacent parcels or securing a “benefit” for them,
windfall to society from all the premature deaths caused by handguns.  And in no
context other than smoking that we can identify do we hear calls for affirmative
subsidies to promote the positive externality of premature death.
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-
Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1256 (1998).
71 For environmentalists, the choice between solar easements and competing uses has
become particularly complicated in California, as many solar panels are being blocked not
by buildings but by trees. See Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/science/earth/07
redwood.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
72 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
73 See id. at 1024–26.
74 Id. at 1024.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1026.
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depending upon the observer’s evaluation of the relative importance of the
use that the restraint favors.77
Because one’s characterization of the regulation as imposing harms or
conferring benefits turned on one’s assessment of the relative importance of
the competing interests rather than on some neutral principle, the distinc-
tion could not “serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory ‘takings’—
which require compensation—from regulatory deprivations that do not
require compensation.”78
It seems that the Court is correct that we may frame a regulation that
may produce a regulatory takings challenge as either benefit-conferring or
harm-avoiding.  In fact, these are the very narratives that we would expect the
affected parties to trot out in any regulatory takings context, each emphasiz-
ing the version of the story that leads to that party’s desired outcome: the
government regulator focusing on the value of its regulation in protecting
others from harm and arguing no taking occurred, and the affected property
owner focusing on the unfairness of having to finance the government’s con-
ferral of benefits on others and arguing that compensation is required.
Because both narratives have a way of weaving through every regulatory tak-
ings case, Justice Scalia looks to see if there is some objective, non-results
oriented way for judges to pick between these narratives and argues that all
we are left with is factual aesthetics: do we like the regulation or the regu-
lated activity more?  The choice Justice Scalia describes then is, essentially, a
choice about to whom to attribute the externality: is the property owner
externalizing the costs of beach development on his neighbors or is the gov-
ernment (on behalf of the neighbors) externalizing the cost of beach protec-
tion on the waterfront property owner?
This situation is quite different, however, from that of mirrored external-
ities.  If we were to hypothesize, for instance, that people would tend to
assign negative externalities to things they dislike and positive externalities to
things they like,79 that would not tell us much about how people choose
which of two mirrored externalities to emphasize.  If we think about it, stop-
77 Id. at 1025 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 1026.  Justice Scalia did not elucidate the exact manner in which the assess-
ment of the importance of the competing interests affects the characterization of the regu-
latory prohibition as “harm-avoiding” or “benefit-conferring.”  Presumably, the State was
arguing for the “harm-avoidance” framing (since the State believed that characterization
obviated the need for compensation), which means that Scalia was suggesting that if we
think the activity prohibited by the regulation (beachfront building) is bad, then we char-
acterize the regulation prohibiting that activity as “harm-avoiding.” Id. at 1026.
79 Other things being equal, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that we will be more
inclined to ascribe positive externalities to an activity, regulation, or decision we view posi-
tively and to ascribe negative externalities to an activity, regulation, or decision we view
negatively.  This tendency might be viewed as a close cousin of the “affect heuristic,” which
suggests that “people tend[ ] to judge” an activity as high benefit and low risk if they like
that activity and “high risk and low benefit” if they dislike the activity. See Melissa L. Finu-
cane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAK-
ING 1, 4 (2000).
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ping development on the beach may result in positive externalities (e.g., less
beach erosion).  However, allowing for development would result in negative
externalities (e.g., more beach erosion).  Contrapositive logic seems to dic-
tate that if we like the first of these, we dislike the mirrored pair.  A person
advocating against beach development could just as easily focus on the posi-
tive externalities as the negative externalities, and vice versa.
Taking a step away from Lucas and thinking about externalities more
generally, we quickly find that for any particular action we approve of (e.g.,
expanding public transportation) that has positive externalities (e.g.,
reduced pollution), the mirrored, disfavored inaction will generate the mir-
rored negative externalities (e.g., increased pollution).  Thus, either the neg-
ative or positive framing would satisfy our desire to attribute positive
externalities to things we like and negative externalities to things we do not.
Conversely, if we disapprove of an action (e.g., gun ownership) that has posi-
tive externalities (e.g., increased ability for people to practice self-defense),
we presumably approve of the decision not to take that action, even though
that choice produces negative externalities (e.g., decreased ability for people
to practice self-defense).  In this latter situation, neither emphasizing the pos-
itive externalities of our disfavored action nor emphasizing the negative
externalities of our favored inaction will satisfy our attribution preferences.
B. The Availability of a Compelling Villain
A second factor that influences the way we frame externalities is the
availability (or absence) of a compelling villain.  It is much easier to tell the
negative story—focused on the negative externalities of a particular course of
conduct—if there is a compelling villain to star in that tale.  For example,
pollution is perhaps the most cited example of a negative externality.80  This
is unsurprising, given that point-source polluters—such as factories and
power plants—are usually easy to identify and serve as focal points for citizen
mobilization.  Indeed, the politics of point-source pollution are classic
“entrepreneurial politics”81 with widely dispersed regulatory benefits and
concentrated regulatory costs.  The negative framing of pollution externali-
ties likely resonates so deeply, in part, because of these ready-made villains.82
80 See, e.g., SUSAN GRANT & CHRIS VIDLER, HEINEMANN ECONOMICS FOR OCR 62 (2004)
(cataloguing negative externalities including pollution, forest destruction, and
“[a]ntisocial behaviour by consumers of alcohol and tobacco” that “can affect the well-
being and health of ‘innocent’ third parties”); MANKIW, supra note 26, at 226 (“Pollution is
a negative externality that can be remedied with regulations or with corrective taxes on
polluting activities.”); Abramowicz, supra note 61, at 55 (“A classic example of a negative
externality is pollution; the polluter does not bear the full cost of its activity.”).
81 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (emphasis omitted).
82 Pollution caused by mobile sources, such as smog from automobile emissions,
presents a more complicated scenario.  It may be difficult to cast automobile drivers as
villains if most of the community’s citizens drive cars.
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The “polluter pays” principle is a classic manifestation of framing polluters as
bad actors who should pay for the harms they inflict on others.83
In contrast, consider education, which is perhaps the quintessential posi-
tive externality.  As discussed in Part I, economists and advocates typically
explain that education creates numerous benefits to society that cannot be
captured by the educated individuals themselves, including more informed
voting, lower crime rates, and economic benefits such as productivity and
faster dissemination of new technologies.84  Of course, failing to educate the
country’s children generates the mirrored set of negative externalities: less
informed voting, higher crime rates, and economic stagnation.
Why, then, does the positive externality framing so dominate academic
and political discourse?  One possible explanation is that the education-fail-
ure narrative lacks an obvious bad guy to drive the negative story home.  Edu-
83 Of course, the “polluter pays” narrative may have less resonance when the polluters
are numerous and dispersed, as is increasingly the case for growing environmental threats
like climate change. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction:
Climate Change and Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,825, 10,828 (2008)
(arguing that policymakers cannot ignore climate change contributions from individual
consumption).  Even in such circumstances, however, activists have still sometimes
attempted to identify segments of the responsible population as villains to be blamed for
negative externalities.  Conversations with Notre Dame Law Professor John Nagle about
this point resulted in the following memorable example: in 2002, the Evangelical Environ-
mental Network launched a “What would Jesus drive?” campaign shaming SUV drivers for
“filling [their] neighbor[s’] lungs with pollution.” Would Jesus Drive an SUV?, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2002), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=125583.
84 See, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 26, at 199 (detailing the positive externalities of educa-
tion, including “more informed voters, which means better government for everyone,”
“lower crime rates,” and increased “development and dissemination of technological
advances”); WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 81 (3d ed. 2012) (“For
example, education generates positive externalities.  Society as a whole benefits from edu-
cation.  Those who acquire more education become better citizens, can read road signs,
and become more productive workers who are better able to support themselves and their
families.  Educated people also are less likely to require public assistance or to resort to
violent crime for income.  Thus, education benefits those getting the education, but it also
confers benefits on others.”); ULBRICH, supra note 13, at 120 (“Yet another approach to
encouraging the consumption of goods with positive externalities, such as education, is to
attempt to stimulate a stronger preference for those goods through educational and infor-
mational methods.”); John O. McGinnis, The Enlightenment Case for Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 75, 79 (2000) (“Education is thought, in economic terms, to have positive
externalities.  In other words, since education creates a network of people with a human
capital that is cumulatively powerful, education produces a greater consumer surplus and
people who are better able to take part in democratic governance.  Thus, we all benefit
from the education of others.” (footnote omitted)). But see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing
Human Capital Acquisition Costs—Or Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or
Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 977 (1993) (“[M]ost of the positive externalities attributed
to education (lower crime rates, lower dependence on welfare, better health, more effi-
cient markets, democratic values), by their nature, show diminishing marginal returns with
incremental levels of education.  Indeed, too much education entails negative externali-
ties: An over-educated work force tends to have low morale, resulting in an actual loss of
productivity.” (footnote omitted)).
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cation issues involve classic “majoritarian politics,” with dispersed costs as well
as dispersed benefits.85  Thus, when public schools are underfunded, the
only obvious villain may be taxpayers themselves.86  Of course, taxpayers are
unlikely to be persuaded by a story that paints them as their own worst ene-
mies.  Similarly, citizens are unlikely to vilify their own children for failing to
learn or to envision their own children becoming uninformed voters,
criminals, or unproductive workers and inflicting the attendant costs on soci-
ety.  As in almost all other contexts, vilifying enemies is most effective “when
the enemy is a clearly delineated, ‘well-defined’ ‘other.’”87  When such an
enemy is unavailable, the positive framing of the relevant externality may be
more likely to prevail.88
C. Exposure of Invisible Externalities
Certain kinds of externalities are both difficult to see and difficult to
measure, usually because they involve increased risk rather than an immedi-
ately discernible, concrete effect.  For example, so-called “security externali-
ties”89 that occur when “a private firm undertakes an action that creates a
vulnerability (or possibly an uncompensated benefit) elsewhere in the econ-
omy”90 may be largely invisible until disaster strikes.91  Similarly, the external-
ities created by maintaining (or failing to maintain) a dam, levee, or other
85 Wilson, supra note 81, at 367 (“When both costs and benefits are widely distributed,
we expect to find majoritarian politics.”).
86 It is certainly possible that other villains might be identified in the public education
context.  In some states, for example, public school advocates are increasingly casting Tea
Party candidates (and other right-wing politicians) as enemies of the public good who are
waging a full-blown “assault” on public education. See, e.g., CJ Werleman, America Is Declin-
ing at the Same Warp Speed That’s Minting Billionaires and Destroying the Middle Class, ALTERNET
(May 5, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/tea-party-and-right/how-quickly-america-declin
ing-same-warp-speed-thats-minting-billiionaires-and.  Perhaps these narratives will be more
likely to employ the negative externality frame. Cf. id. (“What kind of future society the
defectors from the public school rolls envision I cannot say.  However, having spent some
time in the Democratic Republic of Congo—a war-torn hellhole with one of those much
coveted limited central governments, and, not coincidentally, a country in which fewer
than half the school-age population goes to public school—I can say with certainty that I
don’t want to live there.” (quoting an advocate) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87 Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, 60 UCLA L. REV.
884, 942 (2013) (quoting Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1037 (2003)).
88 It is interesting that among the segment of society who rejects public education
most completely, the reasons tend to demonize educators, unions, and others in the public
school system as unmotivated and lazy or even motivated by some nefarious goal (e.g., the
hopes of brainwashing innocent children to accept one form of propaganda or another).
While these ways of thinking (particularly the latter) sit outside of the mainstream, they do
illustrate how one might harness a villain narrative within the arena of educational policy.
89 Philip E. Auerswald et al., Where Private Efficiency Meets Public Vulnerability: The Critical
Infrastructure Challenge, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE 9 (Philip E. Auerswald et
al. eds., 2006) (introducing and discussing the concept of security externalities).
90 Id.
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flood control infrastructure may not be apparent until failure and flooding
occurs.
Once disaster strikes, however, the negative externality frame becomes
the face of the disaster.  At least for a time then, post-disaster, the negative
framing of externalities is likely to dominate public and scholarly discourse.
After Hurricane Katrina, for instance, the rhetoric surrounding New Orle-
ans’s ill-fated levees focused on the tragic costs to New Orleans and its citi-
zens of the levee failure, rather than the potential (future) advantages of
better-maintained levees in preventing future flooding.92
Similarly, during the recent financial crisis, the rhetoric focused on the
way that large bank failures might cascade through the economy, leading to
national, and even global, economic collapse.  In the moment of crisis, no
one was discussing the positive externalities of maintaining a stable banking
system; all eyes were watching the “dire consequences of Lehman[ ] [Broth-
ers’] failure”93 ripple across the globe: “World markets fell, and the dollar
wavered as investors everywhere sold assets across the board and sought ref-
uge in the safest securities they could find, government bonds.”94  Soon, the
rest of the United States’ “largest and most powerful banks” were labeled
“Too Big To Fail,”95 an appellation that itself underscored the fear that cas-
cading failures would trigger global economic collapse.  Like natural disas-
ters, the financial meltdown suggests that, in times of crisis, we gravitate
toward the negative framing.
This analysis suggests that, even outside of crisis, the framing of external-
ities may have a temporal dimension: if the status quo (often assumed to be
the natural, unchangeable state of the world) provides services—positive
externalities—the loss or destruction of which will result in societal costs—
negative externalities—those services may be unrecognized or underap-
preciated until they are lost.96  We may not recognize the societal benefits of
flourishing forests, healthy wetlands, thriving honeybee populations, and a
91 Id. at 160 (arguing that, whereas air pollution “can be monitored on a minute-to-
minute basis[,] [t]he same does not hold for security externalities, where the conse-
quences of lapses in security may not materialize for months or years”).
92 See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, Hurricane Katrina: The Overview; New
Orleans Is Inundated as 2 Levees Fail; Much of Gulf Coast Is Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE4DF1731F932A0575BC0
A9639C8B63 (“A day after New Orleans thought it had narrowly escaped the worst of Hur-
ricane Katrina’s wrath, water broke through two levees on Tuesday and virtually sub-
merged and isolated the city, causing incalculable destruction and rendering it
uninhabitable for weeks to come.”).
93 Landon Thomas Jr., Examining the Ripple Effect of the Lehman Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/worldbusiness/15iht-leh
man.4.16176487.html?_r=0.
94 Id.
95 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283,
1285 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Rhino Entertainment Co.
1970) (“Don’t it always seem to go that you don’t know what you’ve got ‘til it’s gone.  They
paved paradise and put up a parking lot.”).
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stable climate until they are compromised.  Thus, many externalities are
likely to go unnoticed in their positive form and attract attention only once
they have transitioned to negative externalities.  Attempts to identify and
quantify the value of ecosystem services are designed to try to counter this
very phenomenon.
III. WHY FRAMING MATTERS
As the preceding Section suggests, we are constantly making choices,
whether consciously or subconsciously, about the ways we frame externalities,
and, in many contexts, there is sufficient space and opportunity for different
potential narratives to take hold.  The choice of stories is not unlimited or
unconstrained, but usually there will be a choice between positive and nega-
tive stories we can tell.  Certainly, the way we characterize a particular exter-
nality is influenced by our underlying intuitions about appropriate baselines.
But baselines are often contested, rather than settled; fluid, rather than
fixed; and malleable, rather than inflexible.97  Not all property rights are
clearly defined;98 not all constitutional rights are clearly demarcated.99  Like-
wise, the public may be divided about the strength of a moral claim to engage
in a particular activity.  Even where there is currently consensus on those
matters, public opinion can shift over time.100
The externality framing of a particular situation, then, may well change
over time.  If disaster brings the negative externality framing to the fore, the
passage of time and the return to normalcy may shift the framing back to the
positive (and perhaps largely invisible) frame.  Conversely, a story about the
positive externalities of something like vaccination may well flip to a negative
framing if disease outbreaks occur.101  Likewise, the dominant framing can
97 Cf. McConnell & Posner, supra note 46, at 5–12 (discussing four different possible
baselines in the Establishment Clause context); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the
Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2011) (discussing controversies and strategic behavior surrounding the selection of regu-
latory baselines in a wide variety of contexts).
98 See, e.g., STEINEMANN, supra note 1, at 199 (“In cases involving public goods, such as
clean water, [with] unclear property rights, the resolution becomes more difficult.  Who
owns the right to clean water? . . . How should effects in the future (and on future individu-
als’ rights) be considered in present value terms?”).
99 See supra note 63 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the current status of
the right to refuse medical treatment such as vaccines.
100 Ellickson has noted the importance of shifting normative baselines in determining
the assignment of Coasian externalities. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 731 (“[T]he proper
tagging of an externality should change as normal conditions change.  Automobiles when
they first appeared were nuisances to horse travel; as cars began to swamp horse-drawn
vehicles in number, horses were properly perceived as the nuisance.”).
101 See, e.g., Becca Aaronson, Outbreaks Make a Case for Vaccinations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/us/outbreaks-make-a-case-for-vaccinations
.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A5%22
%7D (“A measles outbreak in a North Texas megachurch, where vaccinations were dis-
couraged, and soaring rates of whooping cough across the state are drawing renewed calls
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shift if the positive externality story begins to focus on those who freeride on
the positive externalities generated by others.  In their classic article, One
View of the Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed employ the vaccination example
to define freeloader, explaining that “[t]he freeloader is the person who ref-
uses to be inoculated against smallpox because, given the fact that almost
everyone is inoculated, the risk of smallpox to him is less than the risk of
harm from the inoculation.”102  This framing begins to define freeloaders as
villains and may pave the way for the narrative to shift from the positive exter-
nalities of vaccination to the negative externalities of the freeloader’s “self-
ish” choice to refuse vaccination.  Despite the typical textbook framing of
vaccination as a positive externality, there may already be considerable public
ambivalence about the most natural framing of the vaccination question.
These scenarios suggest that the way we frame mirrored externalities is
not only malleable, but manipulable.  Framing is the most persuasive when it
seems natural, and effective framing must resonate with “common sense,”103
but that does not preclude the potential for political operatives to manipu-
late framing to transform “what counts as common sense.”104  Indeed in
other contexts, political scientists have found framing to have powerful
effects on public perceptions;105 there is no reason to think that externality
frames would prove any different in the hands of political operatives.
for immunization legislation, which some lawmakers and medical professionals argue
would help the state prevent and respond to public health crises.”); Brian Krans, Anti-
Vaccination Movement Causes a Deadly Year in the U.S., HEALTHLINE NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.healthline.com/health-news/children-anti-vaccination-movement-leads-to-dis-
ease-outbreaks-120312 (“Even in 2013, the anti-vaccination movement continues to leave
the door open to outbreaks of diseases that have been all but eradicated by modern
medicine.  These diseases include measles, polio, whooping cough, and more.”); Jennifer
Steinhauer, Public Health Risk Seen as Parents Reject Vaccines, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/us/21vaccine.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias
%3As%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A5%22%7D (“In a highly unusual outbreak of
measles [in San Diego] last month, 12 children fell ill; nine of them had not been inocu-
lated against the virus because their parents objected, and the other three were too young
to receive vaccines. . . . Children who are not vaccinated are unnecessarily susceptible to
serious illnesses . . . but also present a danger to children who have had their shots . . . and
to those children too young to receive certain vaccines.”).
102 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1095 n.13.
103 See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE, at xii–xv (2004) (arguing that “when you control the language, you
control the message” and observing that “frames” are part of the “‘cognitive uncon-
scious’—structures in our brains that we cannot consciously access, but know by their con-
sequences: the way we reason and what counts as common sense”).
104 Id. at xv (arguing that “[r]eframing is changing the way the public sees the world”
and “changing what counts as common sense[,]” and that “[b]ecause language activates
frames, new language is required for new frames”).
105 See, e.g., JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING, at
xi–xiii (1984) (using spatial theory to consider voter uncertainty and the behavior of candi-
dates to develop a theory of voting expectations); SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER,
NEWS THAT MATTERS 4 (1987) (noting how the television news “is a most powerful [fram-
ing] force” because it “prim[es] certain aspects of national life while ignoring others,” thus
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-DEC-14 14:39
164 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
Sometimes policy areas seem untouchable, and it might be that for some
problems externality frames prove stubborn.  In which case, a well-known
strategy is to wait for (or at least capitalize on) crisis, which provides a differ-
ent sort of opening for political opportunism.
Thus, to say that externality framing is influenced by baselines and the
other factors we have identified is only half the story.  The inverse is also true:
the framing of externalities as positive or negative and the accompanying
political narratives affect both the way that we allocate—and reallocate—
rights and the way that we define—and redefine—the social and legal mean-
ing of particular activities.  This potential underscores the importance of
understanding how different framing affects both individual processing of
externalities and political and policy responses to issues.
Section A of this Part examines framing effects on individual cognition,
exploring the effect framing has on the way we think about and process
externalities.  In this discussion, we lean heavily on prospect theory, Nobel
Prize-winning work developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.  Pros-
pect theory highlights a number of elements of human psychology and cog-
nition relevant to our topic.  This theory suggests that we will give much
greater weight and attention to negative externalities and consistently under-
value positive externalities due to loss aversion, the availability heuristic, and
our bimodal response to catastrophic risk.
Section B considers how the framing of mirrored externalities affects
politics.  In particular, we consider (1) how the framing of an externality can
signal the appropriateness of a particular policy solution and shape the terms
of that debate; (2) how framing can bias our sense of what issues demand a
policy response at all; (3) how the negative framing of externalities can pave
the way for redefining underlying rights and entitlements; and (4) how posi-
tive framing creates the potential for hero narratives and even, perhaps, true
heroes.
“set[ting] the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices
made”); JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 19 (1992) (arguing
that those who care moderately about politics are more prone to political framing effects
than those who care a lot about politics or those ambivalent about it); Dennis Chong &
James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103, 104 (2007) (framing is
invoked by leaders to encourage citizens to think about an issue in particular ways); James
N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of
Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671, 671 (2004) (“[C]ontextual forces . . . and individ-
ual attributes . . . affect the success of framing.”); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of
a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 568 (1997)
(finding that framing a KKK rally as a “free speech controversy” led to a more favorable
opinion of the rally); Thomas E. Nelson & Zoe M. Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief
Importance and Opinion, 61 J. OF POL. 1040, 1041 (arguing that issue framing also affects
how much importance individuals will attach to beliefs).
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A. Individual Cognitive Psychology
In 2002, when Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics in
recognition of his work with his deceased co-author, Amos Tversky, the prize
committee summarized its motivation for providing him the award as follows:
“for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic
science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under
uncertainty.”106  While much of the research agenda of Kahneman and Tver-
sky could easily fit under that rubric, the pinnacle of this work is arguably
prospect theory, which is the greatest stride made thus far in behavioral eco-
nomics’ effort to improve upon economics’ assumption that human behavior
is rational and that people make decisions employing something akin to an
expected utility model.107  In contrast to traditional economics, behavioral
economics is rooted in the notion that human capacity for rationality is
limited.108
106 Daniel Kahneman – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/eco-
nomic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahneman-facts.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
107 At the time that Kahneman and Tversky wrote, and in many ways still today,
expected utility theory was at the core of the economic model. See DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 1–2 (2003) (“The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for
economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.”); Mark Kelman, Law and
Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2003) (referring to
the idea that people are “rational, expected-utility maximizers” as the “ground-floor pro-
position” of economic thought).  It is easy to make too much of these baseline economic
assumptions built into much of economic modeling and turn the social science into a
caricature of itself. See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551–52 (1998) (arguing that behavioral economists—specifically
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler—have overplayed criticisms of economic rationality by taking
assumptions implicit in expected-utility theory to an extreme).  But some of the major
assumptions underlying expected utility theory are that human behavior is (1) guided by
an internal cost-benefit calculator, (2) that sifts through relevant information about deci-
sions relating to risks, (3) and motivates us to maximize individual utility, (4) though it
recognizes that that there is generally a diminishing utility of wealth.  For a detailed analy-
sis of expected utility theory’s assumptions, see Lola L. Lopes, Algebra and Process in the
Modeling of Risky Choice, in DECISION MAKING FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 177, 178–79
(Jerome Busemeyer et al. eds., 1995); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 119–23 (1992) (laying out assumptions undergirding
expected utility theory); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psy-
chology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750–52 (1990) (same); Cass R. Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (2002) (describing in
layman’s terms how analysts might employ expected utility in approaching people who are
risk adverse versus risk seeking).
108 This work on bounded rationality really came to the fore through the work of Nobel
laureate Herbert Simon.  Simon responded to expected utility theory by arguing that the
most we can expect from human behavior is bounded rationality: “Since the organism . . .
has neither the senses nor the wits to discover an ‘optimal’ path . . . we are concerned only
with finding a choice mechanism that will lead it to pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that
will permit satisfaction at some specified level of all its needs.” HERBERT A. SIMON, Rational
Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261,
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Kahneman and Tversky laid the groundwork for prospect theory by stud-
ying heuristics—snap judgments that often lead us astray in predictable
ways.109  Once Kahneman and Tversky assembled enough heuristic scholar-
ship, they began to see patterns and attempted to generalize that scholarship
and many fundamental psychological observations into a macro model of
human behavior they called “prospect theory.”110  This model of human
behavior portrayed people as more irrational and nuanced than the tradi-
tional economic model would suggest.  According to Kahneman:
Utility cannot be divorced from emotion, and emotions are triggered by
changes.  A theory of choice that completely ignores feelings such as the
pain of losses and the regret of mistakes is not only descriptively unrealistic,
it also leads to prescriptions that do not maximize the utility of outcomes as
they are actually experienced . . . .111
Below we explain three major features of prospect theory and discuss the
ways these features of human psychology relate to the importance of the way
we frame mirrored externalities.
The first insight of prospect theory is that people tend to evaluate their
prospective options as a matter of relative losses and gains.112  Implicit in
focusing on losses and gains is a very important assessment: the baseline from
270–71 (1957).  Acting less as a critic of economic theory and more as a coach, he sought
to improve the economic model.  He believed that to better enable the tools of economics
to predict human behavior, the predictive model must “be related to [man’s] psychologi-
cal properties as a perceiving, thinking, and learning animal.” HERBERT A. SIMON, Rational-
ity and Administrative Decision Making, in MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL, supra, at
196, 199.
109 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty] (“[P]eople
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assess-
ing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.  In general, these
heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”); see
also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1477 (1998) (“What is especially important in the work of Kahneman and Tversky is that it
shows that shortcuts and rules of thumb are predictable.”).  While the heuristics project
provides a different view of human behavior than the one we find in the expected utility
model, Kahneman and Tversky worked on their research agenda with the hope of improv-
ing economic modeling, particularly expected utility theory.  Like Simon, these scholars do
not dispute that people ought to maximize their utility; their point is that people often fail
to do so and do so in predictable ways.  Indeed, some important works in the bounded
rationality scholarship deal explicitly with how to unite expected utility theory to the
insights of bounded rationality scholarship or, as it is sometimes called, behavioral eco-
nomics. See e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Prospect Theory]; Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
110 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 109, at 263.
111 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93
AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1457 (2003).
112 People “code” information by trying to break down information into more simplis-
tic, digestible chunks. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 109, at 271–74.
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which losses and gains are measured.  We have already discussed the promi-
nence of baselines in evaluating externalities.113  As discussed above, what we
perceive as our baseline can change and even be manipulated, meaning that
what we deem as the baseline (and why we do so) becomes a very important
issue.  Furthermore, prospect theory suggests that our judgments about the
status quo are error prone and that we are unlikely to engage in a nuanced
process when we make those assessments.114
A second insight from prospect theory is that we are likely to put too
much emphasis on potential losses and undervalue the prospect of gains.115
Kahneman and Tversky refer to this emphasis on losses as loss aversion.116  It
is worth noting that, in addition to many similar experimental findings by
behavioral economists, traditional economists have documented loss aversion
repeatedly as they have measured differences in our “willingness to pay” for
some benefit and “willingness to accept” a similarly sized loss and found that
people would pay much less to secure a benefit than they would accept to
compensate for a loss.117
Prospect theory also suggests that because losses and gains are mirror
images of each other and because we value losses much more than gains, the
way that issues are framed can significantly color how people assess various
options.118  Kahneman and Tversky found that when people are presented
with logical equivalents that could be framed as either a loss or a gain, people
were more willing to take risks to avoid losses than they were to pursue
Losses and gains are examples of such chunks, and probably the most important example
for Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristic model of human behavior.
113 See supra Section II.A.
114 Complicating our perspective is the anchoring effect.  Anchoring reflects our ten-
dency to latch on to initial valuations (even if they are irrational) and hold on to them. See
Robert J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining Theory’s New “Prospecting” Agenda: It May Be Social Science,
But Is It News?, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 215, 246 (2010).  Anchoring suggests that our
baseline, even if correctly located initially, can become outdated as we fail to update as we
encounter new information.
115 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 109, at 265–69; Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454–55
(1981).  Expected utility theory suggests that in facing decisions involving uncertainty we
should treat losses and gains of identical sizes virtually the same.  We say “virtually the
same” rather than “the same,” because when it comes to gains we often face diminishing
marginal utility, so even from a rational perspective, decreases in welfare are often more
harmful than increases to welfare. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE,
NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 29 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the law of diminish-
ing marginal utility that stands for the proposition that the more of a positive thing is
received, the less an additional unit of that thing will add to a person’s welfare).
116 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 109, at 278.
117 See R.G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 129–33 (1986); Eliza-
beth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 66–69 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous
Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 223–30 (1993).
118 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 109, at 282; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, supra note 115, at 453.
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gains.119  Significantly, though Kahneman and Tversky presented people
with logical equivalents, their subjects reversed their preferences regarding
their risk tolerance when the frame switched from positive to negative.120
The way Kahneman and Tversky framed the options caused respondents
to systematically alter their preferences.  Just as losses and gains are mirror
images, negative and positive externalities—as we have previously demon-
strated—are also mirror images of each other.  The question is whether
couching things as a negative externality rather than a positive externality
could thus have similar effects.  There is no reason to believe that framing
externalities would be any different from Kahneman and Tversky’s experi-
ments.  Losses are losses, whether from negative externalities or from some
other source; gains are still gains regardless, as well.
Consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s theory and experiments,
research has shown that changing the frame from willingness to pay for bene-
fits to willingness to accept losses increases the mean and median values by
factors from 1.4 and 16.5 times as large.121  Accordingly, the framing of mir-
rored externalities seems likely to have great influence on our valuation of
positive and negative externalities.  And importantly, changing framing is an
essentially costless tool for altering valuations.
A third insight from prospect theory is that people tend to underap-
preciate probabilities associated with risk, particularly low probability,
extreme outcome risk—often referred to as catastrophic risk.  Specifically, we
tend to have a bipolar response to catastrophic risks: we take them much too
seriously, or not nearly seriously enough.122  It is as if, when we examine
catastrophic risk, we examine it carelessly through a pair of binoculars—look
through one end and things appear much bigger than reality; look through
the other end and things appear much smaller.  As examples of this insensi-
tivity, people generally give too much weight to risks associated with the stor-
age of nuclear waste,123 but give insufficient weight to the risks associated
with natural disasters like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes.124
119 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115, at 453.
120 See id.
121 Mohammed Abdellaoui et al., Loss Aversion Under Prospect Theory: A Parameter-Free
Measurement, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1659, 1662 (2007).
122 See VISCUSI, supra note 107, at 149; Jonathan Baron, Cognitive Biases, Cognitive Limits,
and Risk Communication, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 9 (2004); Jolls et al., supra note
109, at 1518; Howard Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,
22 RISK ANALYSIS 655, 658 (2002); Gary H. McClelland et al., Insurance for Low-Probability
Hazards: A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 95 (1993); Sun-
stein, supra note 107, at 61–63.
123 See Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254 SCI.
1603, 1603 (1991); Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 469 (1990).
124 See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS 235–43 (1978); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why Don’t
People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2004) (noting that people
typically do not purchase insurance for “low-probability, high-loss events” even when insur-
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Because there are many catastrophic risks that we tune out, we are prone
to ignore the externalities associated with those risks.  This increases our
exposure to invisible externalities.  Because we will not see the risk until it is
upon us, we will often be forced into the position of having to focus on the
negative reflection of mirrored externalities.
We also will tend to go too far to address other sorts of risks.  This is
particularly the case given the availability heuristic, which suggests that peo-
ple judge risks based on the ease or difficulty of imagining or recalling the
harm associated with a particular risk.125  The heuristic can lead us to err
because there are other factors, besides an event’s probability, that contrib-
ute to it being memorable, such as recentness and vividness.126  Indeed,
“vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can ‘crowd out’ other kinds of
thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is very
small.”127  Because vividness matters, people tend to overestimate worst-case
scenarios for risks that evoke a strong emotional response.128
It seems that negative externalities are more likely to evoke vivid emo-
tional reactions than positive externalities.  While positive and negative exter-
nalities are opposite sides of the same coin, negative externalities highlight
the downside of actions, including some potentially vivid or disturbing down-
sides.  Furthermore, negative externalities (pollution, instead of lack of pollu-
tion, and nuclear meltdown, instead of nuclear stability) paint more vivid
pictures that may trigger the availability heuristic.  As a thought experiment
to make the point, consider the prospect of getting cancer versus the pros-
pect of avoiding cancer.  At least to us, the former evokes a stronger emo-
tional response than the latter.
ance prices are favorable); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard Kunreuther, Managing Catastro-
phe Risk, 23 REG. 4, 2000, at 26, 28–29 (identifying possible reasons people often choose
not to invest in risk mitigation measures in earthquake-prone areas); Paul Slovic et al.,
Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
241, 259–62 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) (discussing studies where people neglect cata-
strophic risks associated with flooding and failing to wear a seat belt).  While on average,
we may conclude that people generally put too much weight on particular catastrophic
risks or too little on others, the data is even more convincing when examined at the indi-
vidual level. See McClelland et al., supra note 122, at 113 (noting that with particular risks
such as contaminated sites and nuclear power generation, people differ in their responses
to such risks but regardless of their response perceive the risks in the extreme (i.e., the risk
is very serious or not serious at all)).
125 See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 109, at 1124.
126 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 37 (2005);
Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465–67 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Sunstein,
supra note 107, at 82.
127 Sunstein, supra note 107, at 82.
128 Id. at 67.
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B. Politics and Policy
1. Externality Framing and “Matched” Solutions
The framing of an externality often strongly suggests a particular policy
solution.129  At the simplest level, when external effects are framed as nega-
tive externalities, the proposed solution is often a tax.130  Framed as positive
externalities, the proposed solution is typically a subsidy.  More broadly,
when confronting a negative externality, the textbook solution is typically a
tax, fine, or perhaps a government prohibition on the activity.131  Proposed
responses to positive externalities, on the other hand, typically include subsi-
129 Cf. Steinacker, supra note 7, at 471 (arguing that “the initial distribution of property
rights . . . defines the situation as either a positive or externality case, which directs future
government actions toward a particular set of policies (e.g., permits, taxes, or regulations
for negative externalities; subsidies, insurance, or regulations for positive ones)”).  In
Steinacker’s view, the matching of policy solutions to externalities is less about framing and
more about initial rights allocations.  Scholars often juxtapose the differing solutions for
negative and positive externalities. See HARFORD, supra note 61, at 108 (“Once we realize
the importance of positive externalities, the obvious solution is the mirror image of the
policies we considered to deal with negative externalities: instead of an externality charge,
an externality subsidy.”); James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental
Law: The Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 372 (2013) (“Just as government can
use penalties to capture negative externalities and make bad activities more expensive, it
can use payments to capture positive externalities and make good activities less expen-
sive.”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SUBSIDIES AND ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING THE
LINKAGES 195 (1996) (“Economic theory provides, in the abstract, a solution to the prob-
lem of externalities: as long as a private activity creates additional costs through negative
externalities, it should be made to pay for them through the imposition of an adequate fee
(Pigouvian tax).  Conversely, if a private activity creates additional benefits through posi-
tive externalities, it should be remunerated for them through an optimal subsidy.”).  Of
course, this matching of particular solutions with negative or positive externalities, respec-
tively, is far from arbitrary.  If negative externalities are envisioned, for instance, as devia-
tions below social norms or conflicts with existing legal entitlements, they are likely to be
punished.  Conversely, if positive externalities are envisioned as going above and beyond
what social norms call for, they are likely to be rewarded.  We thank Carol Rose for her
helpful insights on this matter.
130 See, e.g., PIGOU, supra note 2, at 29–30.
131 See MANKIW, supra note 26, at 226 (“Pollution is a negative externality that can be
remedied with regulations or with corrective taxes on polluting activities.”); MCEACHERN,
supra note 84, at 81 (“Restrictions aimed at maintaining water quality limit what can be
dumped into the nation’s rivers, lakes, and oceans.  Noise restrictions aim at maintaining
peace and quiet.  Local zoning laws limit where firms can locate and in what condition
homes must be maintained.  In short, government restrictions try to reduce negative exter-
nalities.”); Laxminarayan & Brown, supra note 35, at 25 (discussing antibiotic use as impos-
ing negative externalities on future users and thus suggesting that “[o]ne potential
economic solution to the problem of divergence between the rate of antibiotic use in a
decentralized situation and the optimal rate can be corrected by imposing an optimal tax
on antibiotics”); id. (suggesting that an additional solution to antibiotic resistance beyond
taxes would include centralized control over which antibiotics are made available to
doctors).
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dies, public education, information disclosure, or government funding or
provision of a particular good.132
Although these differing policy prescriptions may, in some instances,
produce similar efficiencies,133 the distributional effects of these various
mechanisms can diverge dramatically.  When we internalize a so-called posi-
tive externality by, for example, subsidizing production of a particular good,
we increase the surplus of the producer to match the societal benefit of that
good.  That is, in order to ensure that no societal surplus is left on the table,
we transfer that surplus—in the form of the subsidy—to the producer, on the
theory that it is better that someone (the producer) have that surplus than
for society to incur the deadweight loss of no one capturing the surplus.  If,
instead, we choose to impose a tax on production of that good, we require
the producer to reimburse society for the societal costs of production.  Thus,
the choice between framing an externality as negative or positive can alter
the perceived fit of potential solutions, which, in turn, can lead to quite dif-
ferent distributional outcomes.134
132 See HARFORD, supra note 61, at 108 (“Once we realize the importance of positive
externalities, the obvious solution is the mirror image of the policies we considered to deal
with negative externalities: instead of an externality charge, an externality subsidy.  Vac-
cinations, for example, are often subsidized by governments or by aid agencies; scientific
research, too, usually gets a big dose of government funding.”); MANKIW, supra note 25, at
199 (noting that the appropriate government solution to the market failure of positive
externalities is a subsidy, which is “exactly the opposite to the case of negative externali-
ties,” which require taxes “to bring the market equilibrium closer to the social optimum”);
id. (observing that positive externalities require subsidies rather than taxes and thus
“[e]ducation is heavily subsidized through public schools and government scholarships”);
MCEACHERN, supra note 84, at 81 (“When there are positive externalities, governments aim
to increase the level of production beyond that which would be chosen privately.  For
example, governments try to increase the level of education by providing free primary and
secondary education, by requiring students to stay in school until they reach 16 years of
age, by subsidizing public higher education, and by offering tax breaks for some education
expenditures.”); ULBRICH, supra note 13, at 113 (“Among the methods of addressing posi-
tive externalities are producing the good or service in the public sector, paying with taxes,
providing public subsidies to private production, or mandating the consumption of the
good or service.”); id. at 120 (“Yet another approach to encouraging the consumption of
goods with positive externalities, such as education, is to attempt to stimulate a stronger
preference for those goods through educational and informational methods.”); Giuseppe
Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 23 (2009) (“In general, positive-
externality problems are commonly regarded as a justification for public goods provision,
subsidies, or regulation rather than for liability.”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 128, at 195 (“Conversely, if a private activity creates additional benefits through
positive externalities, it should be remunerated for them through an optimal subsidy.”).
133 This might be true if, for instance, we are choosing between a tax and a subsidy of
comparable amounts.
134 A related possibility is that instead of the externality framing driving the proposed
solutions, the perceived desirability of a particular solution might drive the way that the
externality is framed.  Thus, if a subsidy seems a more appealing (or effective) remedy to a
particular problem than a fine, the issue might be described in terms of positive, rather
than negative, externalities.  This possibility admits both the potential influence of practi-
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Of course, just because a particular framing suggests a particular,
“matched” solution does not mean that solution will be adopted.  While the
matched solution may seem preordained, its adoption is far from a foregone
conclusion.  Nevertheless, the first solution the framing suggests—the one
that seems most natural given the framing choice—provides a starting point
for evaluating the appropriateness of alternative policy prescriptions.  That
solution may “anchor” subsequent debates about appropriate policy
responses, and behavioral economics research suggests that people tend to
give undue weight to this initial anchor when making decisions.135  Conse-
quently, initial framing choices may have at least some staying power to shape
the terms and outcomes of subsequent policy debates.
Real life, however, is undoubtedly more complex than either economic
theory or controlled experiments.  Any given problem might elicit a range of
different solutions—some that “match” a positive externality framing and
some that “match” a negative externality framing.  This might occur when
both framings feature prominently in the public discourse about a particular
issue.  In addition, this scenario may occur when the dominant characteriza-
tion of an externality changes over time and different policy responses
accrete over time.  It may, of course, also occur for a variety of reasons that
have little to do with externality framing.  For instance, taxing rather than
subsidizing “too big to fail” banks was hardly a workable solution to looming
financial collapse.136
Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider how well, for example, govern-
ment solutions for education match the predominant externality framing.
Government’s main response to primary and secondary-level education is
cal, historical, and normative factors in shaping baseline assumptions about the appropri-
ateness of particular remedies, as well as the potential for political actors to affirmatively
manipulate externality characterizations in order to achieve particular political aims.  This
latter potential is explored more fully in Part III.
135 The “anchoring effect” was first identified by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.
See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 109, at 1124–30.  Both
their research and later research have hypothesized a variety of mechanisms by which the
anchor exerts its influence on subsequent decision-making. See Adrian Furnham & Hua
Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. SOCIO-ECON. 35, 37 (2011) (summa-
rizing different possible anchoring mechanisms).  The experimental evidence for anchor-
ing has generally considered “numerical” anchors, not the kind of policy solution anchors
that would be at issue here, so further experimental research would be necessary to test
this hypothesis. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
136 Similarly, subsidies may be used in a variety of contexts where affordability and dis-
tributional concerns exist.  For instance, subsidized rates for the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) are often advocated on the ground that property owners will otherwise be
unable to purchase insurance at all. See, e.g., Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther,
Addressing Affordability in the National Flood Insurance Program 2 (Risk Mgmt. & Decision
Processes Ctr., Working Paper No. 2013-12, 2013), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn
.edu/risk/library/WP2013-12_Affordability-NFIP_CK-HK.pdf (arguing that concerns
about affordability necessitate subsidizing some NFIP policyholders, but that this should be
accomplished through a “means-tested voucher program” rather than subsidized insurance
rates).
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one that aligns with the positive externality framing: government provision of
the good (free, public education).  The same can also be said of post-secon-
dary education, as student loans have historically allowed students to attend
colleges at subsidized rates, and many states provide funding for public uni-
versities that then offer subsidized tuition rates to students.  At first blush,
compulsory school attendance laws for children might seem like a page out
of the negative-externality playbook (forbidding parents from keeping chil-
dren out of school), but they are equally consistent with a standard, if less
commonly employed, positive externality solution: government purchase
mandates to increase consumption of a good beyond the level that private
demand alone would dictate.137
It is, of course, quite possible that remedies for positive and negative
externalities could exist simultaneously.  If a school district fines parents for
violating compulsory education laws, then the government is both subsi-
dizing school attendance and penalizing non-attendance.  Similarly, the same
jurisdiction might impose a tax on landowners who destroy wetlands on their
property and offer a subsidy to landowners who choose to preserve wetlands
on their property.
However, our framing of externalities can create tunnel vision that
focuses our attention on only one manifestation of the problem, and thus on
only one set of solutions.  Interestingly, even scholars who at least implicitly
recognize the potential for mirror image framing of externalities and the
need to bring the standard solutions for both positive and negative externali-
ties to bear on a given problem sometimes appear to uncritically accept the
need to match the externality framing with its preferred solution.
For example, Eric Kades, in a careful examination of policy solutions for
the externalities of antibiotic use, describes antibiotic use as generating nega-
tive externalities that should be dealt with by imposing a Pigovian tax.138  In
the same article, he also describes the use of diagnostic tests that can
decrease unnecessary antibiotic use as generating positive externalities that
137 See, e.g., MCEACHERN, supra note 84, at 81 (“When there are positive externalities,
governments aim to increase the level of production beyond that which would be chosen
privately.  For example, governments try to increase the level of education by providing
free primary and secondary education, by requiring students to stay in school until they
reach 16 years of age, by subsidizing public higher education, and by offering tax breaks
for some education expenditures.”).  The willingness to compel children (but not adults)
to attend school may relate to our underlying intuitions about the propriety (and constitu-
tionality) of intruding on the life choices of competent adults, concerns that are amelio-
rated with children, over whom the state can arguably exercise more of a parens patriae
power.  Moreover, state compulsion of school attendance by children might be seen as a
response to a different externality: parenting choices that affect a child’s long-term pros-
pects.  The same kind of externality might be one motivation for compulsory childhood
vaccination laws (where parenting choices can affect the child’s long-term health).  Com-
pulsory education laws might also go hand in hand with efforts to prevent exploitation of
child labor.
138 See generally Kades, supra note 36, at 638–43.
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should be dealt with by subsidizing test use.139  Although he notes that the
problem of “less than optimal use of tests for antibiotic efficacy” is, in some
respects, “simply the inverse of the overuse of antibiotics in the absence of a
Pigovian tax,”140 he does not consider whether we should pay patients, more
generally, not to use antibiotics (subsidize all non-use) or tax or fine individu-
als who do not utilize available diagnostic tests before taking antibiotics.141
In some sense, then, Kades’s menu of potential solutions appears to be con-
strained by his framing of the particular externalities and the solutions that
framing suggests.
One approach to public decision-making that may counter some of the
matched-solution-suggesting effects of externality framing is scenario-based
planning, which may help bracket a problem by exposing both the positive
effects of acting and the negative effects of declining to act (or vice versa).
Scenario planning typically tests different future scenarios against a no-action
baseline, so that both action and no-action alternatives are on the table.  So,
for example, a baseline scenario might demonstrate the negative externali-
ties of failing to build a public transportation network and an accompanying
scenario might demonstrate the positive externalities of that infrastructure
investment.  Such an approach may thus call attention to the mirrored exter-
nalities inherent in any particular decision, which may encourage considera-
tion of the full set of potential solutions.  Often, however, this kind of
decision-making focuses on public infrastructure choices that generate exter-
nalities, rather than on individual actions that generate externalities.142
139 Id. at 638–42.
140 Id. at 641.
141 Perhaps Kades would argue that he is effectively proposing to subsidize all appropri-
ate non-use (as the tests are the most effective way to distinguish when use is justified), and
that he is effectively proposing to tax those who do not use the tests through the more
general Pigovian tax on antibiotics.  Despite his description of the “Pigovian subsidy” for
testing as the “mirror image of the Pigovian tax on antibiotics,” id. at 639, the subsidy he
proposes is not the exact mirror image of the tax, as the tax is for all antibiotic use
(whether or not a test has revealed that the use is appropriate) and the subsidy is only for
testing, not for all decisions to refrain from using antibiotics (such as a decision not to use
antibiotics to treat a minor, non-threatening bacterial infection).  Perhaps this divergence
can be explained on a number of different grounds, but at least one explanation is that
Kades is trapped by his own framing of the externalities; he does not explicitly consider
whether all decisions to forego antibiotics generate positive externalities and thus should
be subsidized, or whether the decision to forego testing creates negative externalities that
thus should be taxed.  Kades does suggest that a subsidy to indigent patients to help them
pay the Pigovian tax on antibiotics would be appropriate to address distributional “equity
concern[s].” Id. at 665.
142 To be sure, we can easily identify situations where scenario-based decision-making
implicates private actions as well.  For example, many states have adopted laws that require
decisions about building private infrastructure to undergo an alternative analysis when
these decisions impact the environment.  For example, in California, most projects that
require a state or local agency to issue a discretionary permit (like conditional use zoning
permits) must comply with requirements relating to analysis of impacts and alternatives,
public disclosure, and serious consideration of community input.  These requirements are
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2. The Bias Toward “Remedying” Negative Externalities
The framing of externalities has the potential to influence not only
which solutions we propose for a particular problem but also whether we
decide that a problem needs solving at all.  Specifically, we are more inclined
to force internalization of negative externalities than to ensure internaliza-
tion of positive externalities.143  Indeed, even a cursory examination of the
list of common remedies for positive externalities suggests that we feel less
need to take a heavy hand in correcting positive externalities.  While the pol-
icy prescriptions for both negative and positive externalities include
equivalent “‘hard’ economic incentives”144—taxes and subsidies, respec-
tively—the positive externality solutions list often seems to veer quite quickly
into softer, more voluntary, and arguably less effective tacks such as persua-
sion and education.145
Moreover, when scholars advocate internalizing externalities, they are
often focused on internalizing negative externalities—social costs.146  Corpus
linguistics analysis also suggests that we talk about internalization of costs sig-
nificantly more than we discuss internalization of benefits.  The Google
Ngram for the trigrams “internalize negative externalities” and “internalize
positive externalities” shows that, after the mid-1990s, the two phrases diverge
considerably: the frequency of “internalize negative externalities” increases
found in the California Environmental Quality Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21006
(West 2014).  Some other states have similar statutes. See, e.g., Massachusetts Environmen-
tal Policy Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61–62 (West 2014); Washington State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030 (West 2014).
143 See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108
MICH. L. REV. 189, 189 (2009) (“Ideally, from an economic perspective, both the negative
and positive externalities should be internalized by those who produce them, for with full
internalization, injurers and benefactors alike would behave efficiently.  In actuality, how-
ever, whereas the law does require that injurers bear the harms they create (or wrongfully
create), benefactors are seldom entitled to recover for benefits they voluntarily confer on
recipients without the latter’s consent . . . .”).
144 Kades, supra note 36, at 638.
145 Cf. id. (arguing that in the context of antibiotic overuse, “ ‘hard’ economic incen-
tives, such as taxes, subsidies, and changes in patent rights, are much more effective mea-
sures than legislative fiat, jawboning, and education”).  Of course, softer solutions, such as
public education, are sometimes described as solutions for negative externalities as well
(for example, to discourage consumption of a good that creates negative externalities).
See, e.g., ULBRICH, supra note 13, at 120 (“Yet another approach to encouraging the con-
sumption of goods with positive externalities, such as education, is to attempt to stimulate
a stronger preference for those goods through educational and informational methods.
Likewise, it is possible to discourage the consumption of goods with negative externali-
ties—alcohol, cigarettes, tobacco—through advertising and educational campaigns.”).
146 See, e.g., ULBRICH, supra note 13, at 116 (discussing “internalizing externalities” as
the internalizing of social costs). But see MANKIW, supra note 26, at 201 (observing that
“[t]o remedy the problem [of externalities], government can internalize the externality by
taxing goods that have negative externalities and subsidizing goods that have positive
externalities”).
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quite dramatically while “internalize positive externalities” declines.147
Today, “internalize negative externalities” is used about three times as fre-
quently as “internalize positive externalities.”148
A query in COCA for collocates associated with “internalize” likewise
demonstrates that we typically speak of internalizing negative rather than
positive externalities.  Among the psychological associations of the word,
there are also telling economic associations, specifically with the words
“costs” and “externalities.”  “Internalize” collocates with “costs” fifty-seven
times and with “externalities” twenty-two times, which confirms that the most
common framing of “internalize” is negative.  A line-by-line context analysis
of the twenty-two instances that “internalize” collocates with “externalities”
further supports this conclusion, as context demonstrates that nineteen of
those instances refer to internalizing negative externalities.149
Beyond this corpus linguistics evidence, our common law system also
demonstrates a bias toward internalizing negative but not positive externali-
ties.150  The common law is largely geared toward developing mechanisms
for forcing internalization of negative externalities rather than creating
mechanisms for facilitating capture of positive externalities.  The property
law doctrine of nuisance forces internalization of particularly egregious nega-
tive externalities,151 but provides no comparable doctrine for recoupment of
even the most beneficial positive externalities.  In Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District,152 the Supreme Court approved this use of prop-
erty law, observing that “[i]nsisting that landowners internalize the negative
externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy,
and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.”153
The Supreme Court has never identified a comparable state land use policy
of internalizing positive externalities.154  Tort law, likewise, provides a mech-




nalities%3B%2Cc0 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
148 Id.
149 Even without a line-by-line analysis of the context, these results make sense.  Since
“externalities” generally refer to “negative externalities,” it intuitively follows that “internal-
ize externalities” really means the more precise “internalize negative externalities.”
150 See, e.g., Parchomovosky & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 228 (“The contrast between
the legal system’s extensive mechanisms for dealing with negative externalities and its mea-
ger resources for coping with positive spillovers is striking.”).
151 See, e.g., id. at 225–26 (describing nuisance law as “a corrective mechanism that
forces each owner to take account of the negative effects of her actions on other owners
and engage only in those activities that do not unduly interfere with the interests of proxi-
mate property owners”).
152 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
153 Id. at 2595.
154 Of course, this may well be because the Supreme Court doesn’t opine on general
issues of state land use very often and because state actions imposing costs, rather than
those conferring benefits, are generally those that raise constitutional concerns and spur
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anism for forcing those who cause harm to others to internalize those costs
under certain circumstances, but it provides no comparable mechanism for a
positive-externality generator to force third parties to compensate it for the
benefits it confers.  Similarly, in contract law, while direct conferral of bene-
fits is sometimes compensated under the quasi-contract doctrine of unjust
enrichment, its scope is limited and narrow.155
Of course, there are a wide variety of potential explanations for this
asymmetry, including the difficulty of valuing unsolicited benefits and the
potential unfairness of requiring people to reimburse others for benefits they
neither solicited nor desired.156  Nonetheless, our common law experience
likely perpetuates a bias toward remedying negative externalities.  It both
confirms and reinforces the view that we should focus our efforts and
resources on solving problems framed as negative externalities; consequently,
we are less used to thinking about issues framed as creating positive externali-
ties as serious problems that need to be solved.  In short, a negative external-
ity is often viewed as a call to action, while a positive externality is merely an
occasion for celebration.
One explanation for this bias toward “solving” negative externalities may
be loss aversion writ large.157  As the prior subsection demonstrates, loss aver-
sion causes individuals to overvalue losses as compared to foregone gains,
and those cumulative individual errors can affect the demand for legislation.
Legislation addressing issues with a predominantly negative externality fram-
ing may thus be oversupplied relative to legislation addressing issues with a
predominantly positive externality framing.
The potential for “availability cascades,” a term coined by Timur Kuran
and Cass Sunstein,158 is also higher when the negative framing is empha-
sized.  An availability cascade is “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief
formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that
gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in
public discourse.”159  These cascades compound and propagate the kind of
“availability errors” discussed in Section III.A.  Typically these cascades are
most successful when they are focused on a narrative rife with negative exter-
constitutional takings challenges.  Nonetheless, we are not aware of any general land use
principle that facilitates internalization of positive externalities.
155 See, e.g., Parchomovosky & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 228 (“[U]njust enrichment
entitles an aggrieved party to restitution only in cases of ill-gotten gains, when the benefac-
tor did not intend to confer the benefit on the recipient.”).
156 See id. at 230–36 (cataloguing and critiquing rationales for the common law’s focus
on forcing internalization of negative, but not positive, externalities).
157 Steinacker, supra note 7, at 474 (“The initial assignment of rights sets [the] baseline
and determines how salient any future adjustments toward the optimal level will be to the
general public.  Negative externalities are more likely to make it onto the public agenda.”);
id. at 461 (“Loss aversion suggests that a situation structured so that change produces a
negative externality is more likely to be perceived as a problem than if the change pro-
duces a positive externality.”).
158 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 683.
159 Id.
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nalities.  Most of Kuran and Sunstein’s examples of availability cascades,
including Love Canal, Alar in apples, airplane crashes, asbestos, and Agent
Orange, feature nightmare scenarios of negative externalities.160  Emphasiz-
ing the negative mirrored externalities, then, creates more opportunities for
availability cascades and more resulting demand for legislative response.
One could imagine that the particular salience of negative externalities is
confined mostly to the litigation context, particularly suits based on the com-
mon law, which is—for the many reasons described—focused on remedying
negative externalities.  It might well be true that legislation is more likely to
focus on positive externalities than litigation, but phenomena like availability
cascades suggest that, even in the legislative context, discussion of negative
externalities may be more likely to spur remedial action.
3. Externality Framing and Rights Redefinition
As the prior subsection describes, we often think of negative externalities
as a call to action and positive externalities as an occasion for celebration.
Emphasizing negative externalities can, as previously described, push toward
solutions like taxes and prohibitions and galvanize political action to imple-
ment those policy solutions.  One of the important ways in which focusing on
negative externalities galvanizes this kind of action may be by delegitimizing
existing legal and moral entitlements to engage in a particular activity.  This
argument suggests that there is a symbiotic, mutually constitutive relationship
between externality framing and existing entitlements: existing entitlements
shape the most natural externality framing, and externality framing, in turn,
shapes our sense of appropriate entitlements.
Understanding the forces that shape our sense of the social and legal
meaning of particular acts is an important but complicated endeavor.  In the
context of smoking, for instance, Richard Posner has noted his agreement
with Larry Lessig that “behavior can be altered by changing various margins,
including the meaning of particular acts,” such as whether smoking “mean[s]
being a cool cat” or instead “mean[s] being a dirty addict,” but he then
argues that the truly “interesting question is how such valences change.”161
The bidirectional, symbiotic relationship between externality framing and
160 Id. at 681–92, 703; see also id. at 688–89 (“Among the diverse social transformations
that exhibit striking examples of availability cascades are the rise and decline of McCarthy-
ism; the struggle for black civil rights; the student rebellions of the 1960s; the spread of
affirmative action and the recent explosion of public opposition to it; the rise of feminism,
the anti-tax movement, and the religious right; ongoing campaigns against pornography,
hate speech, smoking, health maintenance organizations, and the burning of black
churches; the spread of ethnic and religious separatism across the world; the persistence
and sudden fall of communism; the global turn toward market-friendly government poli-
cies; campaigns for safe sex; the enforcement of Megan’s Law, designed to inform a com-
munity when a convicted sex offender moves in; and finally, the emergence of the
Federalist Society at American law schools.”).
161 Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Com-
ment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 563 (1998).
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underlying legal and moral entitlements suggests that one way to alter the
social and legal meaning of particular activities is by changing the way that
associated externalities are framed in public discourse.
One of the primary ways that anti-smoking campaigns successfully
decreased the social acceptability of smoking and created momentum for
smoking bans in public places was by focusing on the negative externalities of
smoking, including secondhand smoke.  As one scholar has explained:
In the smoking context, it is in campaigns that emphasise the harms of
smoking on others that the moral overtones are felt most prominently.  Such
harms include the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke but also
the emotional effects of a smoker’s tobacco-related disability or premature
death on their children.  For example, a recent anti-smoking campaign in
Australia shows a young boy entering a busy train station with what appears
to be his mother, who subsequently disappears from view.  Much of the spot
depicts the child becoming increasingly distressed, ending with the voice-
over, “If this is how your child feels after losing you for a minute, just imag-
ine if they lost you for life.”  Such campaigns help denormalise smoking by
portraying its harmful effects on others.162
Although it is, of course, impossible to tell a definitive story of cause and
effect, antismoking campaigns emphasizing the negative externalities of
smoking appear to have helped “denormalize” smoking,163 shifting the base-
line assumption from smoking as a normal, socially acceptable activity (even
a right) to an antisocial activity that can be regulated and banished from the
public sphere.  Studies by the tobacco industry itself demonstrated that
“[d]uring the 1990s, eroding social acceptability of smoking emerged as a
major threat [to the tobacco industry], largely from increasing awareness of
the dangers of secondhand smoke among nonsmokers and smokers.”164
162 Kristin Voigt, “If You Smoke, You Stink.”  Denormalisation Strategies for the Improvement of
Health-Related Behaviours: The Case of Tobacco, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POL-
ICY 52 (Daniel Strech et al. eds., 2013).
163 Id. at 48 (noting that “denormalisation” includes “‘all the programs and actions
undertaken to reinforce the fact that tobacco use is not (and should not be) a mainstream
or normal activity in our society . . . urging current smokers to quit, and thereby conform
with the smoke-free majority’” and that the California Department of Health Services
“describes . . . ‘social norm change’ as an attempt ‘to indirectly influence current and
potential future tobacco users by creating a social milieu and legal climate in which
tobacco becomes less desirable, less acceptable, and less accessible’” (citations omitted)).
164 Pamela M. Ling & Stanton A. Glantz, Using Tobacco-Industry Marketing Research to
Design More Effective Tobacco-Control Campaigns, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2983, 2983 (2002); see
also id. at 2986 (“Tobacco companies closely monitored the social acceptability of smoking.
Philip Morris conducted segmentation studies based on attitudes about smoking issues
(smoking and health, the dangers of secondhand smoke, social pressures against smoking,
or opinions about government regulation) among both smokers and nonsmokers in the
1960s and in 1988, 1990, 1991, and 1994.  They consistently showed that about half of
smokers felt uncomfortable about smoking, largely because of price and smoking’s effect
on other people.” (internal citations omitted)); id. at 2987 (explaining that in the 1990s,
studies by R.J. Reynolds found that “[m]ore smokers were concerned about the effects of
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Scholarly analysis of antismoking campaigns found that the most effec-
tive campaign messages for persuading all audiences were emphasizing
secondhand smoke and tobacco industry “manipulation” of customers.  The
studies also found that secondhand smoke advertisements were particularly
effective in denormalizing smoking.165  Campaigns emphasizing secondhand
smoke externalities seem to have been aimed specifically at altering the base-
line assumption that smokers should have the right to smoke in public, and
even in their own homes.  In particular, this “strategy” was designed “[t]o
counter the industry’s use of patriotic concepts like liberty and freedom to
choose whether to smoke” by demonstrating “that many people involuntarily
breathe secondhand smoke at work and in public places and that children
breathe their parents’ smoke.”166
This same strategy of emphasizing secondhand smoke externalities like-
wise featured prominently in political efforts to regulate smoking in public
places.  Advocating for a city-wide ban on smoking in public places—one of
the first such bans in the country—New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
framed the issue before the City Council in terms of negative externalities,
asking: “Does your desire to smoke anywhere at any time trump the right of
others to breathe clean air in the workplace?”167  These efforts were the natu-
ral culmination of the redefinition of both the social meaning and legal enti-
tlements surrounding smoking.168  And indoor smoking bans, in turn,
secondhand smoke on others” and that R.J. Reynolds identified “a new [market] segment,
Social Guilt, which accounted for 24% of the market”).
165 See Lisa K. Goldman & Stanton A. Glantz, Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Cam-
paigns, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 772, 776 (1998) (“Industry manipulation and secondhand
smoke are the most effective strategies for reaching all audiences. . . . Secondhand smoke
advertisements also denormalize smoking and heighten interest about smoking among
both smokers and nonsmokers.”).  The focus on tobacco industry manipulation might be
useful in creating a compelling villain.
166 Id. at 775.  Additionally,
[a]mong youth, secondhand smoke messages can awaken a “sense of injustice for
the little guy.”  “Living Room,” a California advertisement, portrays a brother and
his much younger sister watching television.  As the brother smokes, the sister
begins coughing and smoke comes out of her mouth.  This advertisement was
effective among both adults and youth because it showed the child as a helpless
victim and made people aware of the effects of their smoking on others.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
167 David B. Caruso, Bloomberg Public Health Legacy Lauded in NYC, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/22/bloomberg-public-health_
n_4489289.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Emphasizing negative externalities to argue for a particular definition (or redefini-
tion) of existing rights may be a litigation tactic as well as a political tactic. See, e.g., Koontz
v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) (noting the govern-
ment’s argument opposing a Nollan/Dolan takings claim that wetlands destruction gener-
ates negative externalities and imposes costs on the surrounding community).
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further denormalize smoking by “implicitly defining smoking as an antisocial
act.”169
The use of secondhand smoke negative externalities to frame the discus-
sion of smoking and ultimately to denormalize smoking and limit the right to
smoke in public places suggests that there is a symbiotic relationship between
externality framing and underlying legal and moral entitlements, with each
influencing the other.  Accordingly, the choice to emphasize the negative
half of the mirrored externality pair can have important consequences for
our sense of the legal and moral entitlement to engage in a particular
activity.
Perhaps the “broccoli horrible” of the ACA debate was a bit prescient:
obesity may be the next target of a negative-externality campaign aimed at
redefining the social and legal meaning of food choices.  In a recent article
in the Harvard Political Review, Andrew Seo praised former New York Mayor
169 Voigt, supra note 162, at 49 (“[C]lean indoor air legislation reduces smoking
because it undercuts the social support network for smoking by implicitly defining smok-
ing as an antisocial act.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stanton A. Glantz, Achieving a
Smokefree Society, 76 CIRCULATION 746 (1987))).  A positive externality narrative, on the
other hand, may flow from a sense that a particular entity has a right to engage in a partic-
ular activity—such that its decision to refrain is a “gift” to the community.  In turn, that
positive framing may encourage subsidies, which reinforce the view that the actor is enti-
tled to engage in that activity and must be paid not to do so. Cf. MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGE-
RIAL ECONOMICS 424 (2008) (observing that an “important distinction” between taxes and
subsidies is that “[s]ubsidies imply that firms have a right to pollute because society pays to
reduce pollution,” while “a system of pollution taxes asserts society’s right to a clean envi-
ronment” and that “[f]irms must reimburse society for the damage caused by their
pollution”).
Even in those contexts in which the positive framing of a mirrored externality seems
most resilient, however, there may nonetheless be some room at the margins for the
reframing of externalities and thus the redefinition of underlying rights.  Our earlier dis-
cussion of patent externalities suggested that it is much easier to speak of the positive
externalities of inventions than to speak of the negative externalities of a failure to invent.
Even in this context, however, there may be room at the edges for recharacterization.  At
least in the context of underutilized patents—those that are neither used by the patent-
holder nor licensed by the patent-holder to others—most countries aside from the United
States have concluded that the public has a sufficiently strong interest in the fruits of an
inventor’s creativity to provide for compulsory licensing of otherwise unused patents. See
Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1275, 1276.  Such compulsory licensing strikes at the heart of the idea of a patent as
the ability to exclude, and yet it is commonplace in most intellectual property regimes. See
id.  While these regimes do not go as far as recognizing a (difficult to conceptualize and
likely impossible to enforce) collective public property right in “ideas that haven’t yet been
invented,” Lemley, supra note 37, at 1098 n.4, they do acknowledge some limited public
right to enjoy the benefits of ideas that have been invented but not yet brought to fruition
by the inventor or a licensee of the inventor’s choosing.  One could certainly imagine a
political campaign for compulsory U.S. licensing emphasizing the negative externalities of
non-use of valuable patents and demonizing so-called “patent trolls” for creating drag on
innovation and invention.  Such a campaign might well make inroads in the U.S. despite its
traditional resistance to compulsory licensing.
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Michael Bloomberg’s ban on selling soda in containers larger than sixteen
ounces.  He argued:
The plan’s opponents, however, neglect the incontrovertible fact that
obesity has serious negative externalities and costs.  This is our self-inflicted
21st century public health crisis, much like smoking was in the last century.
The government has spent decades targeting smoking, and as a result the
number of adults who smoke is declining.  Mayor Bloomberg isn’t touting
his plan as a panacea.  Rather, the soda ban represents the first step in the
right direction towards addressing this crisis.170
Consider a third example, this time dealing with exactions—deals that
landowners make with governmental entities (most often local governments
exercising land use power) when seeking permits, in which the government
relaxes some regulation (like a zoning ordinance) in consideration for some
other concession by a permit applicant (like a negative easement).  The lim-
its of a government’s power to exact a concession from a landowner—the
fine line between striking a deal and “taking” private property—are laid out
in two U.S. Supreme Court cases.  The first of these, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,171 mandates that any concession won by the government
must have an “essential nexus” to the “original purpose” of the legal restric-
tion that would otherwise have prohibited the project applicant’s propo-
sal.172  A subsequent case, Dolan v. City of Tigard,173 clarified that an
“essential nexus” is necessary but not sufficient.174  The government must
also show “rough proportionality” between the concession and the negative
impact of the proposal.175
It should come as no surprise that at the time the Court handed down
Nollan and Dolan (and for the most part still today), many saw these opinions
as a pointed rejection of government overreaching.176  In the wake of these
opinions, most commenters seemed to assume that, to the extent that bar-
gaining would still occur, the government’s ability to exact concessions—and
thus the bargaining costs for landowners entering into these deals with gov-
ernment—would decrease.
170 Andrew Seo, New York Got It Right, HARV. POL. REV. (Sept. 18, 2012, 4:51 PM), http:/
/harvardpolitics.com/united-states/new-york-got-it-right/.
171 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
172 Id. at 837.
173 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
174 Id. at 383.
175 Id. at 391.
176 See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s
Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105 (2001)
(“The cases initially engendered fears about their potentially chilling effects on land use
practices.”); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13 (2000) (“The Nollan/Dolan rules are perhaps best understood as a
highly visible symbolic protest against governmental excess.  The decisions proved so psy-
chologically gratifying for landowners that few property-rights advocates have been willing
to look behind the decisions’ anti-government rhetoric to consider their true impact on
property rights and on the community.”).
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To the surprise of many, when negotiation did ensue after Nollan and
Dolan, the cost of bargaining with the government, at least in some jurisdic-
tions, went up—not down.  What explains this result?  These findings are
documented in an interesting article by Ann Carlson and Daniel Pollak, in
which they argue that when local governments began to look closely at valu-
ing the true harms caused by development, those governments found more
harm to mitigate.177  The true version of events, then, was that not all govern-
ments were overreaching prior to Nollan and Dolan.  Rather, the results of
Carlson and Pollak’s study suggest that when jurisdictions applied the tests
laid out in Nollan and Dolan, they determined that they were not reaching far
enough.
While there is little reason to doubt that Carlson’s prognosis is correct,
externality framing poses an alternative hypothesis (and, of course, these
explanations do not have to be mutually exclusive).  The analysis that the
Court demanded in Nollan and Dolan made governments look at the societal
costs of proposed developments: it replaced the task of striking a deal with a
forced negative externality framing and accounting.  The negative externality
framing could have put local governments on the road toward reallocating
rights.  Given that this accounting of losses is a matter of public record,
neighbors and other concerned parties could also become more attuned to
the stakes of a particular decision and come to see that decision through the
perspective-altering lens of a negative externality frame.
4. The Potential for Hero Narratives (and True Heroes?)
Given all of the foregoing, why would anyone ever consciously choose
the positive framing of a particular externality?  One obvious reason, of
course, is that the person has a vested interest in ensuring that a particular
issue is not solved or aggressively pursued.  Scholars might be inclined to
label something a positive externality when they think encouraging internal-
ization is unnecessary or even counterproductive, as internalization of posi-
tive externalities is less likely to occur.  These reasons for choosing the
positive externality framing of an issue are essentially the inverse of those for
choosing a negative framing.
Another reason for positive framing is that while negative externality
framing both is aided by the existence of a villain and constructs villains to
justify changes in existing entitlements and legal policies, the positive exter-
nality framing constructs heroes.  Indeed, a positive externality framing
allows the actor to cast himself in the hero role.  For example, imagine a
corporation that pays less than a living wage in a particular community.  One
could imagine the corporation making contributions to local charities and
telling a story of the positive externalities of those donations, a story that
prominently features the corporation as a pillar of the community.  That pos-
177 See id. at 120 (documenting the move away from property bartering to impact fees
as a result of Nollan and Dolan and finding that the cases encouraged the imposition of
higher impact fees).
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itive externality story would stand in sharp contrast to a story focused on the
negative externalities that would result from the company’s failure to make
charitable contributions to a workforce it has arguably helped impoverish.178
Choosing to emphasize the positive externalities of donating, rather than the
negative externalities of failure to donate, then, allows the company to signal
to the wider community that it is a good community citizen.
One final, and perhaps more noble, reason for positive externality fram-
ing is that positive framing may be more suited to rhetoric calling on society
(sometimes through the vehicle of government and sometimes not) to make
a sacrifice for the public good.  In fact, when pressed to define what the “pub-
lic good” means in a particular context, we often sketch out the positive
externalities.  Indeed, in the context of purely voluntary action, there is some
experimental evidence that positive framing motivates higher levels of coop-
eration and investment in public goods.179
Within the political context, we may see this play out as policymakers try
to persuade constituencies to take voluntary steps to create positive externali-
ties.  It is, after all, little surprise that it was the “1000 Points of Light” cam-
paign instead of the “1000 Candle Snuffers.”
CONCLUSION
Each time an externality is framed as positive or negative, we make a
choice.  When we identify the negative externalities of a decision, we could
just as easily identify its positive externalities because the negative and posi-
tive externalities are actually a mirror reflection of each other.  Sometimes
factors make one frame dominate the other, including society’s baseline
178 For recent attempts to use the negative externality story to villainize corporations
like Walmart and McDonald’s, see Barry Ritholtz, How Walmart’s Low Wages Cost All Ameri-
cans, Not Just Its Workers, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 18, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2013/12/18/walmart_n_4466850.html (arguing that low wages mean
that “employees of [Walmart and McDonald’s] are often the largest recipients of [public]
aid in their states” and that “we should put the full costs of shopping at Wal-Mart [sic] back
where they belong: On the customers and the company itself”); see also Barry Ritholtz, How
McDonald’s and Wal-Mart Became Welfare Queens, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013, 9:23 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/how-mcdonald-s-and-wal-mart-became-wel-
fare-queens.html (making the same argument).
179 See James Andreoni, Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative
Framing on Cooperation in Experiments, 1 Q.J. ECON. 1, 10 (1995) (finding that “framing the
choice” to invest in a public good “as a positive externality substantially increases coopera-
tion over framing the decision as a negative externality”); Eun-Soo Park, Warm-Glow Versus
Cold-Prickle: A Further Experimental Study of Framing Effects on Free-Riding, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 405, 415 (2000) (finding that this effect was particularly pronounced for people with
an individualist value orientation, as opposed to a more cooperative value orientation).
This effect may be particularly pronounced where the positive externalities are associated
with what one perceives as an affirmative act rather than inaction. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson,
The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners 7–8 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Stud. in Law, Econ., and
Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 499, 2014) (“Compared to a person who has altruistically
refrained from acting, a person who has carried out a helpful act is more likely to feel a
warm glow of self-satisfaction and to anticipate status rewards from others.”).
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sense of the actor’s legal or moral entitlement to engage in (or refrain from
engaging in) particular behavior, the availability of a villain to whom to
ascribe negative externalities, and the relative invisibility of certain externali-
ties until disaster strikes, when the negative framing becomes the face of the
crisis.  Often, however, the frame can change, is subject to choice, and can be
manipulated.
While scholars have rarely focused on mirrored externalities, externality
framing effects have very serious ramifications.  The way we frame an exter-
nality can have profound effects on both individual cognition—the way we
think about and process externalities—and on our politics and policy devel-
opment.  Prospect theory suggests that due to loss aversion, the availability
heuristic, and our bimodal response to catastrophic risk, we will give much
greater weight and attention to negative externalities and undervalue positive
externalities.
The way we frame externalities also has serious implications for policy
decision-making.  While we find that positive frames create the possibility for
hero narratives of voluntary sacrifice for the common good and may spur
individual action, in most contexts we find that negative frames tend to domi-
nate positive frames.  Moreover, we find that framing can shape the array of
policy prescriptions we are likely to consider and that we often reserve the
strongest forms of government interventions for negative externalities.  Addi-
tionally, in the policy arena, negative frames do better in competing for and
sustaining our attention.  Strong dominance of negative frames may serve as
a “call to action” and ignite campaigns to redefine legal and social rights and
obligations.  The stakes in framing decisions—whether subject to our control
and manipulation or limited by circumstances—are high, particularly
because externalities are ubiquitous.  Mirrored externalities matter because
framing matters.  It would serve us well to pay attention to them; we neglect
them at our peril.
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